Neurophenomenology Integrating Subjective Experience and Brain Dynamics in the Neuroscience of Consciousness

By Antoine Lutz, Evan Thompson. 2003

439 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c040e3bf39d77f59b5d43a5f92296c2b1b54dcf8

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Citations in the corpus

The sense of agency – a phenomenological consequence of enacting sensorimotor schemes (2017, background): “In developing it, we follow the general research direction of neurophenomenology (Varela 1995, 1999; see also Gallagher 1997; Lutz and Thompson 2003) according to which phenomenological descriptions of lived experience and naturalistic explanations are contrasted in order to uncover their mutual…”
The Phenomenological Mind (2007, unknown): “The British philosopher McTaggart (1908), writing around the same time as Husserl, tried to resolve the paradox by distinguishing between the A-series (past–present–future) – a psychological experience of succession that involves constant becoming (things constantly coming to the present and then mo”
Mind wandering and attention during focused meditation: A fine-grained temporal analysis of fluctuating cognitive states (2012, unknown): “This is promising for moving subjective methods forward in neuroimaging research, and provides impetus for the extension and development of other neurophenomenological paradigms (Lutz and Thompson, 2003).”
Neurophenomenology: An Introduction for Neurophilosophers (2005, background): “Neurophenomenology and Affective-Cognitive Neuroscience The enactive approach in its neurophenomenological development converges with the growing recognition in affective-cognitive neuroscience that much more detailed and refined first-person descriptions of conscious experience are needed in order ”
Lost in thoughts: Neural markers of low alertness during mind wandering (2011, background): “It further demonstrates that neuro-phenomenological approaches to the study of subjective experience are possible in neuroscience (Lutz and Thompson, 2003) yet argues for the need of a more fine-grained taxonomy of private mental states.”
Self-Centeredness and Selflessness: A Theory of Self-Based Psychological Functioning and Its Consequences for Happiness (2011, unknown): “…Ekman, Davidson, Ricard, & Wallace, 2005; Ricard, 2006; Wallace & Shapiro, 2006; Walsh & Shapiro, 2006), which also underline various approaches taken in by both western and eastern psychology (e.g., Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch, 2000; Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Thompson, 2004; Varela & Shear, 1999).”
The extended body: a case study in the neurophenomenology of social interaction (2012, unknown): “6 For a more detailed discussion of this methodology: Varela et al. (1991); Gallagher (1997); Varela (1997); Roy et al. (1999); Lutz and Thompson (2003); Di Paolo et al. (2010); and Froese et al. (2011).”
Mind The Hype: A Critical Evaluation and Prescriptive Agenda for Research on Mindfulness and Meditation (2017, unknown): “At a philosophical level, misunderstandings of the work and its implications could limit the potential utility of a method that proposes unique links between first-person data and third-person observations (cf. Lutz & Thompson, 2003).”
Experience sampling during fMRI reveals default network and executive system contributions to mind wandering (2009, background): “Instead, by using introspective reports alongside behavioral and brain imaging measures (71), and by creating experimental situations in which they reciprocally constrain each other (24, 69, 73), we may be able to further enrich our understanding of the elusive nature of subjective experience.”
Framing a phenomenological interview: what, why and how (2016, methodology): “…example is the use of interviews within the so-called method of neurophenomenology to help combine neuroscience and phenomenology (Varela 1996; Lutz et al. 2002; Lutz 2002; Lutz and Thompson 2003; Reinerman-Jones et al. 2013; Bockelman et al. 2013; Gallagher et al. 2014; Colombetti 2014, chap 6.).”
Emotion Experience and its Varieties (2009, background): “The guiding principles of such training have been outlined in Asian studies of consciousness under the label of training in mindfulness, and in the European phenomenological tradition (see Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991).”
Mindfulness Revisited (2015, background): “…and refined first-person descriptions of subjective experience as a heuristic for mapping, interpreting, and quantifying distinct cognitive processes and neural substrates as well as neurodynamics links between networks (Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Thompson, 2006, 2007, 2014; Vago, 2013; Varela, 1996).”
Investigating the Phenomenological Matrix of Mindfulness-related Practices from a Neurocognitive Perspective (2015, background): “Rather, such changes will be expressed in the reorganization of interrelated, coherent large-scale networks, and as such, network-level descriptions likely are the most useful explanatory level for capturing some key features of highly practiced meditative states (Lutz & Thompson, 2003).”