Self‐Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism*

By John W. Maxwell, Thomas P Lyon, S. Hackett. Journal law and economy, 2000

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Corporate Environmental Management: Regulatory and Market-Based Incentives (2002, background): “Firms may also have incentives to self-regulate to preempt consumer groups from lobbying for more stringent abatement regulations, particularly when it is not very costly for consumer groups to organize themselves and influence the political process (Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett 2000).”
The strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards (2006, background): “[23] model regulation as a political influence game in which firms reduce pollution in order to preempt government action.”
Attracting responsible employees: Green production as labor market screening (2008, background): “Other proposed explanations include pre-emption of new taxes or regulations (Maxwell et al. 2000), or signalling a "nice type" in order to get lenient treatment when new regulations are about to be introduced (Heyes 2005a).”