Attracting responsible employees: Green production as labor market screening
By Kjell Arne Brekke, Karine Nyborg. 2008
239 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Marketing, Safety Research, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fd663cc9e8a2682cb2e68120552c6b0d16d1af08
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Marketing
- Simon Glossner
- Roland Bénabou
- Rachel T. A. Croson
- Jean Tirole
- Luca Lambertini
- Nicolas Treich
- Alessandro Tampieri
- John Rand
In Safety Research
- Nicolas Treich
- Rachel T. A. Croson
- Roland Bénabou
- Jean Tirole
- Simon Glossner
- F. Tarp
- Raymond E. Levitt
- W. Scott
In Strategy and Management
- Nicolas Treich
- Rachel T. A. Croson
- Simon Glossner
- F. Tarp
- Roland Bénabou
- Jean Tirole
- W. Henisz
- Luca Lambertini
Citations in the corpus
- Incentives, performance and desirability of socially responsible firms in a Cournot oligopoly (2015, background): “Other contributions study the desirability of CSR (Baron, 2001), the role of CSR in selecting motivated agents (Brekke and Nyborg, 2008) or the firm competition in the presence of “green” consumers (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzs, 2009) or social pressure (Baron, 2009).”
- Investor horizons, long-term blockholders, and corporate social responsibility (2019, background): “Examples of this would be: customers paying a higher price for fair-trade products or organic food or, as Brekke and Nyborg (2008) argue, morally motivated employees choosing socially responsible firms.”
- Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking (2016, background): “…but reciprocal—that is, dependent on the presence in the same firm of other people who act cooperatively ðe.g., Kosfeld and von Siemens 2011Þ, or on the firm fulfilling a socially valuable mission rather than merely maximizing profits ðe.g., Besley and Ghatak 2005, 2006; Brekke and Nyborg 2008Þ.”
- Corporate Social Responsibility in a Competitive Business Environment (2020, background): “Finally, the idea that employees value the social responsibility of their employers has been proposed both in theory and tested empirically (Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Brekke & Nyborg, 2008, 2010; Heal, 2005; Nyborg & Zhang, 2013).”
- Toward a unified theory of project governance: economic, sociological and psychological supports for relational contracting (2012, background): “…a company they perceive to be socially responsible, demand lower wages or benefits or exert greater effort (Preston, 1989; Turban and Greening, 1997; Greening and Turban, 2000; Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Collier and Esteban, 2007; Bhattacharya et al., 2008; Brekke and Nyborg, 2008; Kim et al., 2010).”
- Behavioral Environmental Economics: Promises and Challenges (2014, background): “One a more positive side, CER supply may be a way to screen employees who may be more motivated, and more able to work in teams (Brekke and Nyborg 2008) or may reflect intrinsic preferences of firm leadership.”
- Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility (2010, background): “Some corporations provide incentives for employee engagement in community service, thereby boosting public relations with the local communities and attracting motivated employees (Besley and Ghatak 2005; Brekke and Nyborg 2008).”
- Employer–Employee Congruence in Environmental Values: An Exploration of Effects on Job Satisfaction and Creativity (2014, unknown): “For example, Brekke and Nyborg (2008) develop a model that suggests a firm’s environmental orientation (along with other corporate social responsibility investments) can act as a labormarket screeningmechanism, allowing ‘‘green’’ (i.e., socially responsible) firms to attract more productive workers.”
- Playing with the Good Guys - A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation (2011, unknown): “Our proposal is partly based on Brekke and Nyborg (2008), who demonstrate that if cooperative behavior is derived from an underlying ethical principle, while the weight attached to this principle varies between individuals, one would expect to find a positive correlation between individuals’ coopera”