Association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong

By Charles J. P. Chen, B. Jaggi. 2000

1,038 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4921544f39fe2ff8d5282b1a2b5248f6c3fd20ff

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In Accounting

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Citations in the corpus

Firm ownership and board characteristics: Do they matter for corporate social responsibility disclosure of Indian companies? (2015, background): “Chen and Jaggi (2000) find that the proportion of independent directors is positively related with mandatory disclosure.”
Determinants of audit report lag: Does implementing corporate governance have any impact? Empirical evidence from Egypt (2009, background): “Outside (independent) non-executive directors (IND) are perceived as a tool for monitoring management behavior, resulting in more voluntary disclosure of corporate information ( Chen and Jaggi, 2000”
Attributes of social and human capital disclosure and information asymmetry between managers and investors (2009, background): “With respect to voluntary disclosure, Chen and Jaggi (2000) document that a board that comprises mostly independent non-executive directors is more likely to be associated with comprehensive financial disclosure.”
Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures: Evidence from an Emerging Economy (2012, background): “Independent directors who are less aligned to management may be more inclined to encourage companies to engage in CSR disclosure (Chen and Jaggi 2000).”
The impact of corporate governance on the timeliness of corporate internet reporting by Egyptian listed companies (2008, background): “Studies show a significant relationship which is either positive (such as Abdelsalam and Street (2007), Adams et al. (1998) and Chen and Jaggi (2000)), or negative (such as Eng and Mak (2003)), while Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Ho and Wong (2001) did not find any significant relationship.”
Determinants of intellectual capital disclosure in prospectuses of initial public offerings (2008, background): “Chen and Jaggi (2000) find comprehensive disclosures are positively related to the proportion of independent non-executive directors on corporate boards.”
Drivers of corporate voluntary disclosure: A framework and empirical evidence from Italy and the United States (2007, background): “The dissatisfaction with the quality and effectiveness of financial reporting has also received world wide attention from academics (Bozzolan et al., 2003; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Eng and Mak, 2003; Eng and Teo, 1999; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Hooks et al., 2002; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Lev and Z”
Board Diversity and Corporate Social Disclosure: Evidence from Vietnam (2016, neutral): “For example, Chen and Jaggi (2000) ﬁnd a positive relation between board independence and voluntary disclosure of Hong Kong listed ﬁrms.”
Intellectual capital disclosure and corporate governance structure in UK firms (2008, background): “…proportion of non-executive directors is positively related with the board’s ability to influence voluntary disclosure decisions (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Chen and Jaggi, 2000), others find no relationship (Ho and Wong, 2001; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006), and yet others observe a negative relationship…”