Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing

By Anne-Katrin Roesler, Balázs Szentes. 2017

217 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/99146c08ca3edc9bf5ceab452e583fad1df54d10

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Alessandro Bonatti
2. Stephen Morris
3. Dirk Bergemann
4. Hyun Song Shin
5. Matthew O. Jackson
6. Itay Goldstein
7. Amil Dasgupta

In Marketing

1. Stephen Morris
2. Dirk Bergemann

Citations in the corpus

• Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019, background): “…each segment (which is also an optimal price, by construction), we get point C; and if he charges the highest value in the support, we get point D. Roesler and Szentes (2017) consider a related information design problem in which a single buyer can design her own information about her value…”
• Markets for Information: An Introduction (2018, background): “The implications of an information structure for consumer surplus are analyzed by Roesler and Szentes (2017).”