Experimental evidence on the evolution of meaning of messages in sender-receiver games

By A. Blume, D. DeJong, Yong Gwan Kim, Geoffrey B. Sprinkle. 1998

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Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games (2006, methodology): “, Blume et al., 2001) and argues that the system of subject types should be anchored on the “truster” type of senders and the “believer” type of receivers. In our data, there are indeed senders who always tell the truth (the truster type) and receivers who always believe the senders (the believer ty”
Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions (2003, background): “Andreas Blume et al. (1998, 2001) find evidence of some such types in experiments with communication games.”
Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An Experimental Approach (2003, background): “It is useful because it allows an organization’s members to coordinate activity tacitly without having to reach agreement explicitly in every instance.”