Determinants of Managerial Earnings Guidance Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure and Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

By Amy P. Hutton. 2005

166 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/470b117f4d5603db28baf979e38c066c2600fa7a

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In Accounting

1. Martin Walker
2. I. Wang
3. Shivaram Rajgopal
4. Shuping Chen
5. Vasiliki Athanasakou
6. Alma Cohen
7. Dawn A. Matsumoto
8. L. Bebchuk

In Strategy and Management

1. Martin Walker
2. Alma Cohen
3. Vasiliki Athanasakou
4. L. Bebchuk
5. Dawn A. Matsumoto
6. Shivaram Rajgopal
7. Shuping Chen
8. Charles C. Y. Wang

Citations in the corpus

• The Market Reward for Achieving Analyst Earnings Expectations: Does Managing Expectations or Earnings Matter? (2011, methodology): “Hutton (2005), Cotter et al. (2006), and Houston et al. (2008) find that managers provide earnings guidance when the company’s information environment is uncertain, earnings are important for valuation, and the investment community’s information demands are high.”
• Price Informativeness and Investment Sensitivity to Stock Price (2007, unknown): “Specifically, with the exception of the regression where the dependent variable is CAPX, the coefficient estimate for ð1 R2Þ Q is significantly positive. The coefficient estimate for PIN Q remains positive and significant across all specifications. While the results of the pooled regressions identif”
• Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review and Framework (2008, unknown): “Regarding forecaster characteristics, Hutton and Stocken (2007) examine the effect of firm forecasting reputation on investors’ reactions to management earnings forecasts.”
• Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance (2005, background): “However, Hutton (2005) finds evidence consistent with respondent firms having more active investor relations groups; thus, it is possible the rate of stoppers is less within the population of nonrespondents (since firms with more active investor relations groups are more likely to have a policy of…”
• Private Earnings Guidance and its Implications for Disclosure Regulation (2007, background): “Column (1) shows that Hutton (2005) develops conceptually based ex ante predictions for eight firm characteristics included in her logit.”
• Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns (2012, background): “, 2009), because stock prices are determined by market participants in the aggregate rather than analysts alone, and because the market learns a substantial amount of non-earnings specific information around earnings announcements (see, for e.g., Francis, Schipper, and Vincent, 2002; Hutton, 2005), ”
• Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure (2008, unknown): “In addition, firms with greater analyst following [AC] and greater information asymmetry, proxied by higher forecast dispersion [DISP] and higher return volatility [RVOL], face a greater demand for information and are more likely to disclose (Hutton 2005; Ajinkya and Gift 1984).”