Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance: comment

By Xianming Zhou. 2001

1,109 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/46df07de599575ce1bfcba45ee4c226b256345a2

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Citations in the corpus

Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies (2009, neutral): “Note that we identify blockholder fixed effects in performance through at least two different firms, so the observation of Zhou (2001) about slowly changing ownership and the problem of identification is not of concern for our approach.”
Endogeneity and Empirical Accounting Research (2007, background): “(1999), Zhou (2001) argues that this is likely the case for managerial ownership.”
Corporate Governance and Performance: The REIT Effect (2010, neutral): “Moreover, we expect that cross-sectional variation in corporate governance will be the driver of our results, rather than the small changes in governance over time (Zhou 2001).”
Stakeholder welfare and firm value (2010, positive): “We therefore create a dummy equal to one when the relevant data is missing to control for the possibility that non-reporting firms are discretely different from reporting ones and to avoid a significant reduction in sample size (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Woidtke, 2002).”
Equity Financing in a Myers-Majluf Framework with Private Benefits of Control (2005, background): “However, the incentive-enhancing role of insider ownership suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is absent in Stulz (1988). In other words, it is not clear to what extent the incentive-alignment effect may counter the managerial entrenchment. Unlike the previous research, our analysis in the gener”
Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone (2011, neutral): “Nevertheless, this is not an important limitation since, as highlighted in previous studies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Zhou, 2001), the ownership structure of corporations tends to be relatively stable over time and typically changes slowly from year to year within a company.”
Ownership Structure and Risk in Publicly Held and Privately Owned Banks (2011, positive): “Some studies (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999, Gugler and Weigland, 2003) raise the problem that ownership might be endogenous as it might be influenced by the level of performance and risk of the firm.”
Ownership structure and target returns (2009, neutral): “, Officer (2003), Huang and Walkling (1987), and Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2007) for some evidence on determinants of target returns.”
From the Editors: Endogeneity in international business research (2012, background): “acteristics slowly change over time, the use of fixedeffects removes the theoretical, cross-sectional variation of interest (Zhou, 2001).”
Capital structure and corporate performance: evidence from Jordan (2007, positive): “…share (P/E) (Abdel Shahid, 2003), market value of equity to book value of equity (MBVR), and Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q mixes market value with accounting value and is used to measure the firm's value in many studies (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988, McConnel and Serveas, 1990, and Zhou, 2001).”
Do Directors Perform for Pay (2008, result): “However, Zhou (2001) points out that if Consistent with our results for the Fortune 500 sample, Table 4 shows that higher meeting fees also reduce the likelihood that a director will experience attendance problems in the BHC sample.”