When Mental States Matter, When They Don't, and What That Means for Morality

By Liane L. Young, Lily Tsoi. 2013

100 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7fc4dd230e3dd2dd82b2576c4955d41cbc7c5739

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. Ruth M. J. Byrne
2. Mary Parkinson
3. Fiery Cushman
4. Liane L. Young
5. Shane Timmons
6. Rebecca Saxe
7. Joshua D. Greene
8. David R. Mandel

In Social Psychology

1. Ruth M. J. Byrne
2. Mary Parkinson
3. Fiery Cushman
4. Liane L. Young
5. Shane Timmons
6. Rebecca Saxe
7. Joshua D. Greene

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Ruth M. J. Byrne
2. Fiery Cushman

Citations in the corpus

• Deconstructing intent to reconstruct morality (2015, background): “com primitive concept of ‘morally wrong’ may be ‘wrong for me’ [43,44].”
• Counterfactual and semi-factual thoughts in moral judgements about failed attempts to harm (2017, background): “They consider the individual’s reasons and motivation for carrying out an immoral act, for example, whether it was accidental or coerced (e.g., Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Martin & Cushman, 2016; Monroe, Dillon & Malle, 2014; Young & Tsoi, 2013).”