Behavioral Game Theory

By Simon Gächter. 2008

530 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Citations in the corpus

• Machine Theory of Mind (2018, neutral): “…RL (Ng et al., 2000; Abbeel & Ng, 2004), Bayesian inference (Lucas et al., 2014; Evans et al., 2016), Bayesian Theory of Mind (Baker et al., 2011; Jara-Ettinger et al., 2016; Baker et al., 2017) or game theory (Camerer et al., 2004; Yoshida et al., 2008; Camerer, 2010; Lanctot et al., 2017).”
• Distinguishing trust from risk: An anatomy of the investment game (2010, unknown): “2 Earlier “gift exchange” experiments include Camerer and Weigelt (1988) and Fehr et al. (1993). An alternative approach to analyzing the role of trust on economic behavior is the use of data from surveys that contain direct questions on trust, often based on a question that was pioneered in the Wor”
• Building a Pathway to Cooperation: Negotiation and Social Exchange between Principal and Agent (2006, unknown): “The first study examined effort decisions made by an agent under a series of contracts that varied in social context and compensation structure.”
• Modularity in cognition: framing the debate. (2006, unknown): “In general, the canonical view in economics is coming to be replaced by much more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of actual human psychology (Camerer, 2003).”
• An investment game with third-party intervention (2007, unknown): “8 See, for example, Camerer (2003), Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982), Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997) or Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992) among others.”
• The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria (2007, unknown): “, VHBB [1991] and Camerer and Cachon [1996]).”
• Performance Pay and Multi-Dimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences and Gender (2006, unknown): “In contrast, there is by now considerable evidence indicating that a substantial fraction of people also care about reciprocal fairness (see the overviews by Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Gächter, 2006; and Fehr and Schmidt, 2000). The co-existence of selfish and reciprocally motivated agents changes the ”
• Social ties and coordination on negative reciprocity: The role of affect (2008, unknown): “Negative reciprocity is a behavioral regularity that can play an important role in situations of interest to economists.1 By now, it is a well-documented fact that many individuals are willing to incur a cost in order to punish those who treat them unkindly (Camerer, 2003).”
• Do Markets Erode Social Responsibility (2015, unknown): “    25 choice experiments—e.g., using dictator games—usually reveal heterogeneous concerns for fairness by individuals (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011).”
• Do people behave in experiments as in the field?—evidence from donations (2008, unknown): “The growing field of behavioral economics, which incorporates psychological insights into economics, is very much based on laboratory evidence (Rabin, 1998; Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000; Camerer, 2003).”
• Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics (2009, unknown): “This is an important point in so far as, to date, simple individual selection was believed not to provide an understanding of the phenomena of altruistic punishment reported in many experiments [56].”
• An Experimental Investigation of the Interactions among Intentions, Reciprocity, and Control (2013, unknown): “If the proposal is rejected, both players receive zero (Camerer 2003). generally only accept offers they perceive to be “fair.””
• Charitable Giving as a Signal of Trustworthiness: Disentangling the Signaling Benefits of Altruistic Acts (2013, unknown): “Moreover, empirical evidence has accumulated suggesting that cooperative behavior may be motivated by psychological predispositions to benefit others (henceforth, social preferences) (Camerer, 2003: Ch. 2).”
• Neural mechanisms of social influence (2009, unknown): “…impact of social factors on human behavior: Investigations of such ''social decision-making " (Sanfey, 2007) have the potential to speed the integration of psychologists with both neuroscientists and game theorists, offering a more complete account of human decision-making (Camerer, 2003).”
• Signaling can increase consumers' willingness to pay for green products. Theoretical model and experimental evidence (2019, unknown): “It can easily be implemented as a laboratory experiment, and is therefore a well-suited framework for studying signals of pro-sociality and trustworthiness (Camerer, 2006).”
• Governance Institutions and Economic Activity (2009, unknown): “Growth of such preferences is seen in experiments on ultimatum and dictator games (Colin Camerer 2003, 65-67).”
• OPTIMAL RISK SHARING FOR LAW INVARIANT MONETARY UTILITY FUNCTIONS (2008, unknown): “See [11], [30], and [35] for further details on this issue.”