How Cost-Effective Are Land Retirement Auctions? Estimating the Difference between Payments and Willingness to Accept in the Conservation Reserve Program

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Adapting auctions for the provision of ecosystem services at the landscape scale (2011, background): “There is evidence of this occurring in the US Conservation Reserve Program (Kirwan et al., 2005; Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988).”
The Impact of Information Provision on Agglomeration Bonus Performance: An Experimental Study on Local Networks (2014, unknown): “…Reserve Program in the United States has disbursed nearly $26 billion to retire 36.8 million acres of farmland from agriculture to reduce soil erosion and preserve approximately 1.8 million acres of wetland habitats (Cowan 2010; Ferris and Siikamäki 2009; Kirwan, Lubowski, and Roberts 2005).”
Public Benefits, Private Benefits, and Policy Mechanism Choice for Land-Use Change for Environmental Benefits (2008, unknown): “A further option is to run a conservation auction, in which landholders reveal their willingness to act in response to a subsidy level chosen by them (e.g., Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997; Stoneham et al. 2003; Cason and Gangadharan 2004; Kirwin, Lubowski, and Roberts 2005).”
Cost-effective design of agri-environmental payment programs: U.S. experience in theory and practice (2008, background): “Land retirement is widely viewed as risk reducing by replacing uncertain income from crop production with certain income from annual payments, lowering the level of incentives necessary for retirement (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoot, 1997).”