Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance

By Jeffrey P. Katz. 2006

421 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/44bdfdc738776dd7d987a476f2ba006ca03c41e7

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Citations in the corpus

The Rule of Law and Economic Growth: Where are We? (2011, background): “A theoretical literature has explored the economic effects, in different formulations, of the absence of rule of law: as anarchy (Hirshleifer, 1995), as extortion (Konrad & Skaperdas, 1998), as private predation (Grossman & Kim, 1995), and simply as lawlessness (Dixit, 2004).”
Does Corporate Governance Transparency Affect the Accuracy of Analyst Forecasts (2006, positive): “Prior literature suggests that the demand for private enforcement mechanisms can be higher in the absence of a viable judicial system for enforcing contracts (e.g., Dixit 2003, Anderson and Bandiera 2001).”
Property Rights and EconomicDevelopment (2009, background): “As to which mechanisms linking property rights to investment are at work, this study is unable to find strong support for any particular mechanism, but on the whole, the support is the weakest for the collateral-based view. In a more recent study on Ghana, Goldstein and Udry (2008) exploit the varia”
An institution-based view of executive compensation: A multilevel meta-analytic test (2012, background): “Conflicting normative expectations often occur between formal and informal institutions, because the latter are predicated on relational exchange models in which the identity and reputation of exchange partners matter, whereas the former aim to support more anonymous forms of exchange (Dixit, 2004; ”
Was Development Assistance a Mistake (2012, neutral): “The invisible hand may operate in other areas besides the free market – institutions may emerge much more from the social norms and spontaneous arrangements of many actors than from the diktat of some expert from above (for a great recent treatment of such possibilities, see Dixit (2003)).”
Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment (2016, neutral): “They emphasize the role of repeated interactions and reputation in creating informal property rights (Ahlquist and Prakash 2010; Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Allee and Peinhardt 2010; Cole and English 1991; Dixit 2004).”
Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth (2005, background): “Scholars such as Skaperdas (1992), Grossman and Kim (1995,1996), Hirshleifer (2001) and Dixit (2004) have examined how stable property rights can emerge in such circumstances.”