Abnormalities in the awareness of action.
By Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, D. M. Wolpert, ChrisD . Frith. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2002
891 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Neurology, Social Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/442aea83a61b6e639a5a0d517f5b3d0e78d0f3e3
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Mel Slater
- Jean Decety
- Elisabeth Pacherie
- ChrisD . Frith
- Maria V. Sanchez-Vives
- Jakob Hohwy
- Karl J. Friston
- Shaun Gallagher
In Neurology
- Elisabeth Pacherie
- Patrick Haggard
- Dorothée Legrand
- Département d'Etudes Cognitives
- ChrisD . Frith
- Olaf Blanke
- Karl J. Friston
- Nora D. Volkow
In Social Psychology
- Jean Decety
- Mel Slater
- Elisabeth Pacherie
- Shaun Gallagher
- ChrisD . Frith
- Raphaela Groten
- Maria V. Sanchez-Vives
- Jessica A. Sommerville
Citations in the corpus
- Agency, simulation and self-identification (2004, background): “It is as if the movement, although intended, has been initiated by some external force’ (Blakemore et al., 2002, p. 240).”
- The Neurocircuitry of Impaired Insight in Drug Addiction (2009, positive): “These models primarily highlight internal representations (of the actual, desired and predicted states of our own body and external world) [ 3 ] that possibly utilize the dynamic interactions of specialized component processes via a distributed neural network [4].”
- Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception (2009, background): “My first observation in this connection is that the question as to whether fine-grained visuomotor control requires ‘‘radically different EGOCENTRIC SPATIAL REPRESENTATION IN ACTION AND PERCEPTION 445 kinds of information’’ than is required for purposes of recognition, recall, and reasoning is surel”
- Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency. (2008, neutral): “, 1998) or ‘‘controller’’ (Blakemore et al., 2002)), and internal models subserving the perception of one’s movements, which predict the sensory consequences of one’s movements and deal with the resulting sensory feedback (‘‘forward sensory model’’ (Wolpert et al.”
- The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency (2007, background): “Numerous studies have shown that the perceptual consequences of self-generated actions are attenuated (Blakemore et al., 1998; 1999, 2000, 2002; Claxton, 1975; Collins et al., 1998).”
- Shared representations between self and other: a social cognitive neuroscience view. (2003, background): “[ 81 ]. In addition, Blakemore and Decety have discussed how this forward model could be used to predict what another person will do [82].”
- From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind (2016, background): “…to attempts to identify various comparators in the brain; for example, by using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test the hypothesis that the cerebellum or premotor cortex acts as a central comparator for motor activity (Blakemore et al. 2001, 2002; Blakemore and Sirigu 2003).”
- Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia (2009, background): “Notably, delusions of motor control and auditory hallucinations may respectively reflect tendencies to attribute to external sources active movements and inner speec”
- The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception (2007, background): “It is therefore attractive to use this to explain other psychotic symptoms such as visual and auditory hallucinations that involve mistaken attributions of something inner to something outer.”