Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia

By Paul C. Fletcher, ChrisD . Frith. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2009

1,361 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Psychiatry and Mental health, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cab3ac346fe205d814876cd821f2b682c715bc20

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Citations in the corpus

REBUS and the Anarchic Brain: Toward a Unified Model of the Brain Action of Psychedelics (2019, background): “The question now follows, how does it work (Carhart-Harris, 2019)? Previous commentaries have hypothesized (Fletcher and Frith, 2009) and demonstrated aberrant predictive processing in a variety of psychopathologies, from autism (Van de Cruys et al.”
The Predictive Coding Account of Psychosis (2018, background): “In contrast, the emergence of delusions might result from decreased precision of priors as outlined above (24,58,59) (Figure 1B).”
An Introduction to Model-Based Cognitive Neuroscience (2015, background): “An interesting new approach for visualizing the pattern of activity within a large number of neurons is the state space representation [116].”
Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain (2016, background): “This theme is emerging repeatedly in psychiatry: from false inference as an account of positive symptoms (hallucinations and delusions) in schizophrenia (76), to the loss of central coherence in autism (77).”
Precise minds in uncertain worlds: predictive coding in autism. (2014, background): “Intriguingly, a recent theory of schizophrenia (Adams, Stephan, Brown, & Friston, 2013; Fletcher & Frith, 2009) invoked undue high precision of prediction errors to explain positive symptoms in schizophrenia (hallucinations and delusions).”
Belief in Fake News is Associated with Delusionality, Dogmatism, Religious Fundamentalism, and Reduced Analytic Thinking (2019, positive): “…was examined because although beliefs and perceptions are often treated as separate entities, research indicates that deficits in the same underlying processes (e.g., prediction error signaling) may give rise to both abnormal perceptual experiences and implausible beliefs (Fletcher & Frith, 2009).”
The anatomy of choice: active inference and agency (2013, background): “…from purely theoretical treatments of hierarchical Bayesian inference (Mathys et al., 2011), from theoretical neurobiology (Frank et al., 2007; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Friston et al., 2012b; Pellicano and Burr, 2012) and from empirical studies (Fiorillo et al., 2008; Coull et al., 2011;…”
How does it feel to act together? (2014, background): “Finally, several clinical populations present severe impairments of their sense of agency while retaining an intact capacity to make automatic online corrections of their movements (Jeannerod, 2009; Fletcher & Frith, 2009).”
When the world becomes 'too real': a Bayesian explanation of autistic perception. (2012, background): “surprise” [65]?  How can this account be related to Bayesian models of other neuropsychiatric conditions? For example, in schizophrenia, hallucinations are assumed to result from hyper-priors [66, 67], which would place autistic and schizophrenic symptoms at the extremes of a continuum.”
The Representation of Agents in Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (2016, background): “Fletcher and Frith (2009) argue for a Bayesian approach to explaining psychotic symptoms within a predictive coding framework that aims to account for delusions and hallucinations within a single model, but it is still unable to explain why prediction errors most typically result in symptoms with…”
Understanding beliefs (2015, background): “As proposed by psychopathology researchers (Fletcher and Frith, 2009), many psychotic symptoms (such as the example of paranoia mentioned earlier) may result from a faulty Bayesian system where false or imprecise predictive signals are propagated up the hierarchy of beliefs leading to phenomena…”
The Computational Anatomy of Psychosis (2013, methodology): “Predictive coding in particular has been used in recent formulations of these deficits in schizophrenia (Fletcher and Frith, 2009).”
Explaining delusions of control: the comparator model 20 years on. (2012, background): “This raises the possibility that an account could be developed, within this framework, that would apply to all the positive symptoms associated with schizophrenia (Fletcher & Frith, 2009).”