Fast portscan detection using sequential hypothesis testing
By Jaeyeon Jung, Vern Paxson, Arthur W. Berger, Hari Balakrishnan. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy : Proceedings, 2004
800 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/440b296d3a360bdb6cddaa6802b33d28d235633d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Guofei Gu
- Mark Crovella
- Christophe Diot
- Anukool Lakhina
- Shanika A. Karunasekera
- Chenfeng Vincent Zhou
- C. Leckie
- Syed Ali Khayam
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Guofei Gu
- Mark Crovella
- Christophe Diot
- Anukool Lakhina
- Shanika A. Karunasekera
- Cliff Changchun Zou
- Chenfeng Vincent Zhou
- C. Leckie
In Signal Processing
- Guofei Gu
- Cliff Changchun Zou
- Syed Ali Khayam
- Junaid Khalid
- Syed Akbar Mehdi
- Chenfeng Vincent Zhou
- Shanika A. Karunasekera
- Alvaro A. Cárdenas
Citations in the corpus
- An empirical evaluation of entropy-based traffic anomaly detection (2008, neutral): “, failed connections [6]) are necessary.”
- Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response (2011, methodology): “SPRT has been widely used in various problems in information security such as detecting portscans [55], worms [56], proxies used by spammers [57], and botnets [58].”
- The monitoring and early detection of Internet worms (2005, positive): “Our trend detection system attempts to detect the dynamic trend of monitored traf.c based on the fact that, at the early stage, a worm propagates exponentially with a constant, positive exponential rate.”
- Very Fast Containment of Scanning Worms (2004, neutral): “In abstract terms, the algorithm operates by using an oracle to determine if a connection will fail or succeed.”
- Research Challenges for the Security of Control Systems (2008, neutral): “Unlike previous work [19, 27], we cannot use a fixed model for the attack hypothesis (this is known in statistics as a simple hypothesis testing problem) because for deception attacks, we do not know the attack sequences αk or βk that an adversary will select.”
- Fast Detection of Scanning Worm Infections (2004, methodology): “To detect inbound scans initiated by hosts outside the local network, previous work on which we collaborated [8] used an approach based on sequential hypothesis testing.”
- NOX: towards an operating system for networks (2008, neutral): “simple implementation to that in [11], where scan detection required a traffic choke-point and heuristics to guess whether an IP address is active.”
- A framework for the evaluation of intrusion detection systems (2006, neutral): “Examples of x used in intrusion detection are sequences of system calls [8], sequences of user commands [26], connection attempts to local hosts [12], proportion of accesses (in terms of TCP or UDP packets) to a given port of a machine over a fixed period of time [19] etc.”
- Amplification Hell: Revisiting Network Protocols for DDoS Abuse (2014, background): “propose Threshold Random Walk, an online detection algorithm to detect malicious port scans [11].”
- FRESCO: Modular Composable Security Services for Software-Defined Networks (2013, methodology): “Several exemplar security applications demonstrate both threat detection and mitigation in an OpenFlow network, including scan detectors [16] [34] [15] and BotMiner [11].”
- Revisiting Traffic Anomaly Detection Using Software Defined Networking (2011, background): “Many ADSs have been proposed during the last few years to detect traffic anomalies in the network core [20,22,29,30,31].”
- Characteristics of internet background radiation (2004, background): “A more ne-grained study of remote scanning activity found (for a different day) 13,000 different scanners probing LBL addresses [ 14 ].”
- Mining anomalies using traffic feature distributions (2005, background): “Much of the work in anomaly detection and identification has been restricted to point-solutions for specific types of anomalies, e.g. , portscans [14], worms [17,32], DOS attacks [11], and flash crowds [12].”