Fast Detection of Scanning Worm Infections
By Stuart E. Schechter, Jaeyeon Jung, Arthur W. Berger. International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, 2004
307 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bec5fb628a25ae3837cc88f99c677cbf46f9176c
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In Artificial Intelligence
- Mark Crovella
- Christophe Diot
- Anukool Lakhina
- Syed Ali Khayam
- Khaled Hamed Salah
- Jawwad Ahmed Shamsi
- Narmeen Zakaria Bawany
- P. Arun Raj Kumar
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Cliff Changchun Zou
- Mark Crovella
- Christophe Diot
- Anukool Lakhina
- Syed Ali Khayam
- D. Towsley
- Khaled Hamed Salah
- Jawwad Ahmed Shamsi
In Signal Processing
- Cliff Changchun Zou
- Kang G. Shin
- Jawwad Ahmed Shamsi
- W. Gong
- Xin Hu
- Aditya P. Mathur
- Mark Crovella
- Alvaro A. Cárdenas
Citations in the corpus
- Behavioral detection of malware on mobile handsets (2008, background): “For example, in less than one year, the infection of both Cabir and Commwarrior worms have been reported in more than 20 countries [31] and 0.5 1.5% of MMS traf.c in a Russian mobile network is made up of infected messages (which is already close to the fraction of malicious code in the email…”
- A Survey of Malware Detection Techniques (2007, methodology): “[41] propose reverse sequential hypothesis testing as a method for detecting worms.”
- Software Defined Networking Architecture, Security and Energy Efficiency: A Survey (2017, methodology): “1) Threshold Random Walk with Credit-Based (TRW-CB) Algorithm [114] considers the user to be suspicious if the probability value (i.”
- The monitoring and early detection of Internet worms (2005, background): “[18][19] proposed a “threshold random walk” algorithm to quickly detect and block worm scans based on the excessive illegal scans sent out by worm-infected hosts.”
- Combining OpenFlow and sFlow for an effective and scalable anomaly detection and mitigation mechanism on SDN environments (2014, methodology): “In order to further evaluate the sFlow approach, we implemented the Threshold Random Walk with Credit Based connection rate limiting (TRW-CB) algorithm [33].”
- Cyber–Physical Systems: A Perspective at the Centennial (2012, background): “There have been attacks on natural gas pipeline systems [244], trams [245], power utilities [246], and”
- Very Fast Containment of Scanning Worms (2004, unknown): “In addition to Williamson’s [28, 26] and Staniford’s [21, 23] work on worm containment, Jung et al [ 10 ] have developed a similar containment technique based on TRW.”
- DDoS Attack Detection and Mitigation Using SDN: Methods, Practices, and Solutions (2017, methodology): “Connection success ratio technique takes into account that the probability of successful connection is much higher for a benign host as compared to malicious host [57].”
- Research Challenges for the Security of Control Systems (2008, unknown): “Unlike previous work [19, 27], we cannot use a fixed model for the attack hypothesis (this is known in statistics as a simple hypothesis testing problem) because for deception attacks, we do not know the attack sequences αk or βk that an adversary will select.”
- Control: A perspective (2014, background): “There have been other less reported attacks of a natural gas pipeline system [582], a water system [198], a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system [605], trams [426] and power utilities [267].”
- Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response (2011, methodology): “SPRT has been widely used in various problems in information security such as detecting portscans [55], worms [56], proxies used by spammers [57], and botnets [58].”
- Revisiting Traffic Anomaly Detection Using Software Defined Networking (2011, methodology): “Similarly, the algorithms ported in this work [20,26,29,31] are simply proofs-of-concept to illustrate the flexibility and ease of anomaly detection algorithm implementation on an SDN platform.”
- Mining anomalies using traffic feature distributions (2005, background): “Much of the work in anomaly detection and identification has been restricted to point-solutions for specific types of anomalies, e.g. , portscans [14], worms [17,32], DOS attacks [11], and flash crowds [12].”