A framework for the evaluation of intrusion detection systems
By Alvaro A. Cárdenas, John S. Baras, Karl Seamon. 2006
120 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Control and Systems Engineering, Signal Processing
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Battista Biggio
- Fabio Roli
- Giorgio Fumera
- Ali Akbar Ghorbani
- Giorgio Giacinto
- Ebrahim Bagheri
- Alvaro A. Cárdenas
- Henrik Sandberg
In Control and Systems Engineering
- Battista Biggio
- Fabio Roli
- Henrik Sandberg
- Giorgio Fumera
- Alvaro A. Cárdenas
- Jairo Alonso Giraldo
- Ali Akbar Ghorbani
- Justin Ruths
In Signal Processing
- Battista Biggio
- Fabio Roli
- Giorgio Fumera
- Giorgio Giacinto
- Davide Maiorca
- Ebrahim Bagheri
- Ali Akbar Ghorbani
- Alvaro A. Cárdenas
Citations in the corpus
- Security Evaluation of Pattern Classifiers under Attack (2014, methodology): “An intrinsic limitation of our work is that security evaluation is carried out empirically, and it is thus datadependent; on the other hand, model-driven analyses [12], [17], [38] require a full analytical model of the problem and”
- A Survey of Physics-Based Attack Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems (2018, background): “…curves, most popular metrics for evaluating the classification accuracy of intrusion detection systems can be shown to be a multi-criteria optimization problem between the false-alarm rate, and the true positive rate [14], and all of them depend on the ability of a system to detect some attacks.”
- A detailed analysis of the KDD CUP 99 data set (2009, methodology): “Besides, the performance measure applied in DARPA’98 Evaluation, ROC Curves, has been widely criticized, and since then many researchers have proposed new measures to overcome the existing deficiencies [8], [9], [10], [11], [12].”
- Limiting the Impact of Stealthy Attacks on Industrial Control Systems (2016, background): “Most intrusion detection metrics are variations of the fundamental trade-off between false alarms and true positive rates [11], however, our adversary by definition will never be detected so we cannot use true positive rates (or variations thereof).”