Collective Intentions and Actions

By Philip R. Cohen, J. Morgan, Martha E. Pollack. 2003

660 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4291f28b83420bcc6ebd7552307cfc61630f2b45

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Citations in the corpus

Joint Actions and Group Agents (2006, background): “In John Searle’s ideas about social reality: Extensions, criticisms and reconstructions, edited by D. R. Koepsell and L. S. Moss, 168-83.”
We-Intentions Revisited (2005, background): “8 Searle (1990) criticism is directed in particular against the analysis of weintentions presented in Tuomela and Miller (1988).”
Cooperative gestures: multi-user gestural interactions for co-located groupware (2006, background): “Philosophical literature on “collective intentionality” [3, 31] postulates that collective intentional behavior is a separate phenomenon from the sum of individual intentions.”
The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-Agency (2012, background): “A number of prominent philosophers of action have proposed accounts aimed at capturing the features in virtue of which actions count as joint action (Gilbert, 1989, 1990, 2009; Tuomela & Miller, 1988; Tuomela, 2005; Searle, 1990, 1995; Bratman, 1992, 1993, 2009a, 2009b; Velleman, 1997).”
Shared intention and personal intentions (2009, neutral): “10 Sellars (1963, p. 203); also Searle (1990).”
Language Teacher Cognition in Applied Linguistics Research: Revisiting the Territory, Redrawing the Boundaries, Reclaiming the Relevance (2015, background): “One candidate is a broader concept of intentionality, which is both individual and collective (Searle, 1990), includes the three traditionalmental faculties of cognition, emotion, and motivation (Schweikard & Schmid, 2013), and is central to agency (Wilson & Shpall, 2012; see also Atkinson, 2014, on”
Psychological research on joint action: Theory and data (2011, background): “Some hold that shared intentions differ from individual intentions with respect to the attitude involved (Kutz, 2000; Searle, 1990 [2002]).”
Intentional social action in virtual communities (2002, background): “Philosophers have recently given a great deal of attention to this construct of group intentions, using such labels as “collective intentions” (Searle, 1990), “we-intentions” (Tuomela, 1995), and “shared-intentions” (Bratman, 1997).”
Antecedents and Consequences of Online Social Interactions (2007, background): “Philosophers have given a great deal of attention recently to this construct of group intentions, using such labels as “collective intentions,” “we-intentions,” and “shared intentions” (e.g., Bratman, 1993, 1997; Searle, 1990; Tuomela, 1995, 2000; see Bagozzi, 2000, for a review).”
Bilateral and Unilateral Requests: The Use of Imperatives and Mi X? Interrogatives in Italian (2012, background): “(Searle, 1990) and joint activity (Bratman, 1992; Clark, 2006; Gilbert, 1989; Tomasello, Carpenter,”
Naturalizing joint action: A process-based approach (2012, background): “In particular, the capacity presupposes a Background sense of the other as a candidate for cooperative agency (Searle, 1990, p. 414).”