Shared intention and personal intentions
By Margaret Gilbert. 2009
198 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people share an intention when and only when they are jointly committed to intend as a body to do such-and-such in the future. This account is compared and contrasted with the common approach that treats shared intention as a matter of personal intentions, with particular reference to the work of Michael Bratman.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7eee28322e1b780c55fe5a65e4a68ad529aa0e27
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In Cognitive Neuroscience
In Philosophy
Citations in the corpus
- How does it feel to act together? (2014, background): “Philosophical accounts of joint action (Bratman, 1992, 2009; Gilbert, 1992, 2009; Tuomela, 2007) are typically concerned with the processes involved in making decisions about whether or not to act together and in long-range planning.”
- The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-Agency (2012, background): “A number of prominent philosophers of action have proposed accounts aimed at capturing the features in virtue of which actions count as joint action (Gilbert, 1989, 1990, 2009; Tuomela & Miller, 1988; Tuomela, 2005; Searle, 1990, 1995; Bratman, 1992, 1993, 2009a, 2009b; Velleman, 1997).”