SWATT: softWare-based attestation for embedded devices

By Arvind Seshadri, Adrian Perrig, Leendert van Doorn, Pradeep K. Khosla. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy : Proceedings, 2004

810 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Hardware and Architecture, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/42752f0808e34ca7fa9446a5eff5dfa15fe32f05

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Citations in the corpus

Building Verifiable Trusted Path on Commodity x86 Computers (2012, background): “, configuration attestation provided by system mechanisms [41, 52], or by a trusted system integrator.”
Wireless Sensor Network Security: A Survey (2006, background): “A mechanism named SWATT to verify whether the memory of a sensor node has been changed [69] is proposed by Seshadri et al.”
Automated detection of persistent kernel control-flow attacks (2007, methodology): “Unlike attestation-based techniques [18, 13, 30, 27, 28, 31], which measure code and data at load time, Pioneer is capable of running arbitrary procedures in a trusted manner.”
Kalman filtering with intermittent observations (2004, neutral): “We consider software based attestation [20], secure code execution [21] and secure code update schemes for the RTUs [22].”
Sensor network security: a survey (2009, methodology): “• Software-based approach: In software-based approaches, such as [88], [89], rely on optimal program code and exact time measurements.”
Pioneer: verifying code integrity and enforcing untampered code execution on legacy systems (2005, methodology): “This approach is similar to our earlier work in SWATT [21].”
Copilot - a Coprocessor-based Kernel Runtime Integrity Monitor (2004, neutral): “One of these techniques, SWATT [34], is designed to monitor embedded devices without virtual memory support and is consequently not applicable to the virtual memory-using PC-architecture GNU/Linux hosts targeted by Copi-lot.”
Distributed detection of node replication attacks in sensor networks (2005, methodology): “We assume that the adversary operates in a stealthy manner, attempting to avoid detection, since detection could trigger an automated protocol to sweep the network, using a technique such as SWATT [32] to remove compromised nodes, or draw human attention and/or intervention.”
Challenges in Securing Vehicular Networks (2005, methodology): “For example, as part of the inspection , the mechanic might use SWATT [19] to verify the integrity of the software running on the vehicle's processor.”
HyperSafe: A Lightweight Approach to Provide Lifetime Hypervisor Control-Flow Integrity (2010, background): “They have been leveraged to provide secure loading (with the guaranteed load-time integrity) [49], [32], integrity measureme nt [39], [22], and attestation [41], [42], [45].”
SMART: Secure and Minimal Architecture for (Establishing Dynamic) Root of Trust (2012, methodology): “Attestation that relies on timed software checksums has been also adapted to embedded devices in [36], [38], [40].”
The Sybil attack in sensor networks: analysis & defenses (2004, methodology): “proposed SWAtt [19], a new technique to securely verify the code running on a remote embedded device.”
Code injection attacks on harvard-architecture devices (2008, background): “As opposed to sensor network defense (code attestation, detection of malware infections, intrusion detection [22, 4]) that has been a very active area of research, there has been very little research on node-compromising techniques.”
A Survey on Internet of Things: Architecture, Enabling Technologies, Security and Privacy, and Applications (2017, background): “To defend against the malicious code injection attack, effective code authentication schemes need to be designed and integrated into IoT [114], [142]. c) False data injection attacks: With the captured node or device in IoT, the adversary can inject false data in place of normal data measured by…”
C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (2016, background): “, SWATT [38], Pioneer [37], and VIPER [28]) can be used – under some strict assumptions – for static attestation of certain legacy devices, such as peripherals.”