Fisher—General Motors and the Nature of the Firm*

By B. Klein. Journal law and economy, 2000

134 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3eba835631f2ffc77c6c6b91296aa003dd7bf4b4

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Four formal(izable) theories of the firm (2005, background): “…the firm seems never to have been fully formalized (in the sense of producing a unified account of the costs and benefits of integration), but its classic case is the General Motors-Fisher Body relationship, as described by Klein-Crawford-Alchian and further analyzed by Klein (1988, 2000b, 2004).”
Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences (2006, unknown): “Other case studies examine variations in ocean shipping contracts (Pirrong 1993), organizational arrangements in the French poultry industry (Menard 1996), the interaction of political institutions, regulatory processes and economic conditions for telecommunications regulation (Levy and Spiller 1994”
Relational Incentive Contracts (2003, methodology): “1 can be used to address the first question arising from the interpretation Klein (2000) places on the relationship between GM and Fisher Body: in what way might a larger specific investment make it more diffi cult to sustain a relational contract? But first the model must be adapted to include a sp”
Value Creation in Innovation Ecosystems: How the Structure of Technological Interdependence Affects Firm Performance in New Technology Generations (2010, background): “17 episode of General Motors and Fisher Body as discussed by Klein (1988, 2000) suggests that the rapid increase in demand for closed metal bodies created significant contractual hazards for GM and led GM to acquire Fisher Body.”
Contracts, Extracontractual Incentives, and Ex Post Behavior in Franchise Channel Relationships (2012, background): “Although distinct in their administration (Murry and Heide 1998), both contractual terms and extracontractual incentives are designed to provide agents with an earnings stream that exceeds the short-term gains from shirking or noncompliance (Klein 2000).”
Corporate Suppliers and Customers and Accounting Conservatism (2012, background): “Klein et al. (1978) and Klein (2000) argue that long-term relation-specific investments create assets that have appropriable ‘quasi-rents’, which 4 We note that for private firms, accounting conservatism could be even more important given that these firms do not have publicly available signals of…”