A MORAL PROBLEM

By S. Hilton. 1947

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Citations in the corpus

The meta-ethical grounding of our moral beliefs: Evidence for meta-ethical pluralism (2013, background): “A common assumption amongst philosophers—whether taken as a sign of intuitive moral competence or as a regrettable flaw—is that they are (Blackburn, 1984; Brink, 1989; Mackie, 1977; Shafer-Landau, 2003; Smith, 1994).”
Belief Through Thick and Thin (2015, background): “For example, consider the ongoing debate between motivation externalists and motivational judgment internalists in metaethics (e.g. Stocker 1979, Korsgaard 1986, Smith 1994).”
Moral Spillovers: The Effect of Moral Violations on Deviant Behavior (2008, background): “Finally, people treat their moral beliefs as if they are readily observable, objective facts about the world, much like scientific facts (Shweder, 2002); this perceived objectivity motivates people to defend their moral beliefs and feel justified for doing so (Skitka et al., 2008; Smith, 1994).”
IX—How Does Coherence Matter? (2007, background): “…a good disposition of practical thought is itself a reason to A. Setiya argues persuasively that neither (as I once thought) the left-hand, ‘deliberative’, side of the biconditional is explanatorily prior, nor that (as Smith 1994 seems to suggest) the right-hand, ‘evaluative’, side is prior.”
What is moral reasoning? (2015, background): “…who argue that genuine moral judgments, as a conceptual truth, must be constituted by the emotions (Prinz, 2007).22 Some argue that genuine moral judgments necessarily motivate (Dreier, 1990; Nagel, 1979; Prinz, 2007; Smith, 1994), while others deny this claim (Brink, 1989; Svavarsdottir, 1999).”
Moral Unreason: The Case of Psychopathy (2005, methodology): “Such denial is quite compatible with a Humean theory of motivation (Smith, 1994) and sentimentalist moral theory (Mackie, 1977; Blackburn, 1998).”
Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation (2007, background): “According to the contemporary Humean theory of motivation (cf. Smith 1987; 1994, ch. 4), desires are propositional attitudes characterised by their ‘goal-directedness’ or ‘world-to-mind direction of fit’, in contrast to the ‘mind-to-world direction of fit’ characteristic of belief.”
“Lean not on your own understanding”: Belief that morality is founded on divine authority and non-utilitarian moral judgments (2013, background): “Meta-ethics refers to a set of beliefs that people have about the nature or properties of morality, including beliefs about the origin or foundations of morality— or where morality comes from (Nielsen, 1990; Smith, 1994).”
The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy (2010, background): “Many other philOSOphers, however, have argued for a more objective position (e.g., Brink 1986; Kant 1959; Nagel 1970; Railton 1986; Smith 1994; Sturgeon 1985).”
The Social and Political Implications of Moral Conviction (2014, background): “In other words, people do not accept or expect that their conceptions of morality are or should be contextually contingent or situationally variable, and they are offended at the very idea that morality could be relative (e.g., Darwell, 1998; Pope, 2013; Simpson, 1974; Smith, 1994).”
Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from "acquired sociopathy" [1] (2003, background): “(Smith, 1993, p. 61) While we may ultimately want to accede to something like PI, on the face of it PI as an internalist thesis is too weak to be revealing about the nature of moral judgment.”
A conceptual foundation for organizational information security awareness (2000, background): “Smith (1984), among others, has even argued that it is more intelligible to act for moral reasons than for non-moral ones, although this view has been criticised (Dancy, 1994), on the grounds that moral, or justified, reasons do not imply motivation per se (since Dancy argues that one may see…”