Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation

By Jay C. Hartzell, Laura T. Starks. 2003

2,184 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, positive): “Hartzell and Starks (2003) show the importance of the monitoring role of institutional shareholders, especially in disciplining compensation practices.24 Institutional shareholders are likely to have the expertise necessary to evaluate compensation peer groups and raise credible concerns about the…”
Are US CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence (2012, background): “Hartzell and Starks (2003) focus on the concentration of institutional holdings (the fraction held by the top five institutions) and find that higher concentration is associated with higher use of equity-based compensation, which they interpret as evidence that institutions play a monitoring role.”
The Role of Financial Markets and Innovation in Productivity and Growth in Europe (2007, background): “In particular, institutional investors monitor f irms carefully and actively intervene when needed (see for example Hartzell and Starks, 2003), whereas large family shareholders (or other entrenched individuals) tend to act less favourably (see for example Morck et al., 20 As far as banks are…”
Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial Sectors (2009, neutral): “[12] Hartzell, Jay C.”
Ownership Structure , Limits to Arbitrage and Stock Returns: Evidence from Equity Lending Markets (2016, positive): “…et al. (2014), we find that %Index, measured as the fraction of index-fund ownership 15Prior literature has used measures of investor influence to show that firms with more influential institutional investors have higher CEO pay for performance and lower compensation (Hartzell and Starks (2003)).”
The Sustainability Footprint of Institutional Investors (2018, neutral): “At the investor-level, some empirical studies find no (see, for instance, Hamilton, Jo, and Statman (1993)) or negative effects (see Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin (2005), Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2008), or Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)) of sustainability on investment performance. Other studies, ”
The Price of a CEO's Rolodex (2012, methodology): “For robustness, the second panel of Table 7 considers several alternative measures of governance proposed in previous literature: 1) the G-Index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), 2) the E-index (Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009), 3) the presence of absence of a staggered board (Bebchuck and Cohe”
Effect of institutional ownership on dividends: An agency-theory-based analysis (2016, background): “Such monitoring have been reflected by monitoring institutions’ influences on executive compensation, earnings management, and mergers and acquisitions (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Khan, Dharwadkar, and Brandes, 2005; Velury and Jenkins, 2006).”
Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation for Corporate Social Responsibility (2015, positive): “1988; Jarrell and Poulsen 1988), improving compensation practices by linking pay more directly with performance outcomes (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Matsumura and Shin 2005), and enhancing firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q (McConnell and Servaes 1990).”
The effects of stock liquidity on firm value and corporate governance: Endogeneity and the REIT experiment (2015, background): “Among the different types of investors in REITs, institutional investors are most likely to be monitors and enhance corporate governance (Chung, Firth, and Kim, 2002; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007).”
Corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance in China: panel data evidence on listed non financial companies (2011, result): “Consistent with the conclusions of Hartzell and Starks (2003), Agrawal and Mandelker (1992), Bushee (1998), Wahal and McConnell (2000), Parrino et al. (2003) and Warfield et al. (1995), a review of empirical studies of the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance does not…”