The curse of aid

By Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo, Marta Reynal-Querol. 2008

804 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e508f401f88d14220649d4e7bc346a1461c5e7cd

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Citations in the corpus

Foreign aid and governance in Africa (2016, neutral): “more corruption (Knack, 2001) and causes setbacks to democracy (Djankov et al., 2005).”
Taking State-Capacity Research to the Field: Insights from Collaborations with Tax Authorities (2019, positive): “It is therefore critical to ensure that the distribution of aid itself does not undermine the building of the state’s capacity to collect and manage tax revenues, for example by bypassing the state (e.g. Kaldor, 1963; Djankov et al., 2008; Mascagni, 2016; Bizhan, 2017; Page and Pande, 2018).”
Does foreign aid harm political institutions (2015, methodology): “Appendix C gives full details of the aid classification used.12 All aid values are expressed as a share of GDP in constant international dollars (as per Djankov et al., 2008).”
Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts (2020, positive): “This comparison suggests that aid is not equivalent to natural resources as a source of sovereign rents (Collier 2006; Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2008).”
More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData (2011, background): “Svensson (2000), Bräutigam and Knack (2004), Moss, Pettersson, and van de Walle (2006), Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2008), and Knack (2009) also marshal evidence in support of the hypothesis that aid can reinforce—or even induce—poor governance.”
How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid Distribution (2014, neutral): “…in two meaningful regime changes during the analysis period. since Kenyan politicians have a high risk of election loss, they should have strong incentives to how aId targets votes 295 5 Bräutigam and Knack 2004; djankov, montalvo, and reynal-Querol 2008; svensson 2000; wright and winters 2010.”
The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile regression approach (2012, background): “…examination of the effect of foreign aid on other social and political elements besides corruption can be found in the previous studies, such as Djankov et al. (2008) for the effect on democracy, and Gomanee, Girma et al. (2005) and Gomanee, Morrissey et al. (2005) for the effect on the human…”
Foreign Aid and Regime Change: A Role for Donor Intent (2011, positive): “This logic leads many scholars to expect that foreign aid will exhibit similar properties to other forms of non-tax revenue, such as oil wealth (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2010; Djankov et al., 2008; Morrison, 2009).”
Oil Rents, Corruption, and State Stability: Evidence from Panel Data Regressions (2011, background): “…measures of resource rents that are not only based on the international commodity prices but also on the (time-varying) quantity extracted and the extraction costs (e.g. Hamilton & Clemens, 1999; Gilmore et al., 2005; Djankov et al., 2008; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2009; Haber and Menaldo, 2009).”
On the simultaneity problem in the aid and growth debate (2013, methodology): “(22)In fact, recent research by De Ree and Nillesen (2009) shows that an increase in foreign aid is associated with a signi cant decrease in the likelihood of civil con ict.”
Aid Is Not Oil: Donor Utility, Heterogeneous Aid, and the Aid-Democratization Relationship (2015, background): “For example, see Acemoglu et al. 2008; Boix 2003; Dunning 2008; Epstein et al. 2006; Goldberg, Mvukiyehe, and Wibbels 2008; Haber and Menaldo 2011; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; and Ramsay 2011.”
Chinese aid and local corruption (2018, neutral): “While a number of studies suggest a positive relationship (see e.g. Svensson, 2000; Knack, 2001; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Djankov et al., 2008), 2”