The institutional economics of foreign aid
By Jakob Svensson. 2006
146 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2e78e6cba44afaac0e8a7b71f39fd94743d52eb6
Citations in the corpus
- Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients (2004, unknown): “Unanimity in the EC Council and strong competition among EU member countries over contracts also differentiate the EU from other multilaterals (Martens et al. 2002: 37, 47, 192–93; also see Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Perdersen 1999: ch. 7).”
- Rhetoric versus reality: the best and worst of aid agency practices (2011, unknown): “…that could allow observers to monitor donors, as one small contribution to overcoming the problem of missing feedback and accountability, a problem that is well-documented in the literature ([IMF and World Bank, 2005], [Martens, Mummert, Murrell, and Seabright, 2002] and [Easterly 2006]).”
- Does Foreign Aid Target the Poorest? (2016, unknown): “On the institutional arrangements that insulate multilateral donors from politics, see Rodrik 1996; Martens et al. 2002.”
- Why Do Aid Agencies Exist (2005, unknown): “How this chain of non-aligned preferences affects aid performance has been analysed in detail by Martens et al. (2002). The role of aid agencies could be perceived as providing a mechanism that enables collective action to emerge from these different and often contradictory individual motives.”
- The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy (2012, unknown): “The choice of how to send aid is especially interesting in light of evidence that multilateral aid is often more efficient than bilateral aid (Balogh 1967; Easterly and Pfutze 2008; Lumsdaine 1993; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Martens et al. 2002).”
- World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence (2006, unknown): “22 There is a substantial literature arguing that, even bracketing donor influence, the World Bank’s objective function is not exclusively developmental due to principal-agent problems and other bureaucratic factors (Martens et al., 2002).”