The private values of ‘thickets’ and ‘fences’: towards an updated picture of the use of patents across industries
By M. Reitzig. 2004
128 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management of Technology and Innovation
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3bc10d555fb205860ea0e99b128b71655bb4f0f0
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Cristiano Antonelli
- Ammon J. Salter
- Knut Blind
- Keld Laursen
- Alfonso Gambardella
- J. Edler
- Paola Giuri
- Joachim Henkel
In Management of Technology and Innovation
- Ammon J. Salter
- Keld Laursen
- Knut Blind
- Alfonso Gambardella
- Cristiano Antonelli
- Paola Giuri
- Alessandra Luzzi
- Christopher Heath
Citations in the corpus
- R&D and the Patent Premium (2008, unknown): “innovation. Using data collected by the European Patent Office in 1994 from a survey of patentees (drawn from a stratified random sample of European patents), Reitzig (2004) actually finds that the average number of patents per innovation is 5.35.”
- Motives to patent: Empirical evidence from Germany (2006, background): “Reitzig (2004) also finds based on a data set of European patents, that patent fences in “discrete technologies” are used to exclude competitors, whereas in “complex industries” patent thickets are exchange forums for complementary technology.”
- The Business Governance of Localized Knowledge: An Information Economics Approach for the Economics of Knowledge (2006, background): “Cross-barriers to entry in national markets and transportation costs may favor such agreements (Reitzig, 2004).”
- The market for patents in Europe (2007, background): “Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) have shown that opposed patents are more likely to be correlated with other measures of economic value of the patent, such as forward citations, claims or designated countries.”
- My Precious. The Role of Appropriability Strategies in Shaping Innovative Performance (2005, background): “Cohen et al. (2000) find that firms patent not only to prevent other firms from copying their technology, but also to block other firms from entering their market (see also Reitzig, 2004).”
- On sharks, trolls, and their patent prey—Unrealistic damage awards and firms’ strategies of “being infringed” (2007, background): “This assumption is fulfilled rather well (Cohen et al., 2000; Reitzig, 2004) in industries such as software, telecommunications, and consumer electronics—for which our analysis probably shows more relevance than for other industries (such as chemicals or textiles).”