Identifying Control Motives in Managerial Ownership: Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation

By Shijun Cheng, Venky Nagar, Madhav V. Rajan. 2005

157 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3bbba1b8d18402b7b6f793e614d58562a927e14a

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Citations in the corpus

The choice of corporate liquidity and corporate governance (2009, background): “26See Romano (1987), Karpo¤ and Malatesta (1989), Matheson and Olson (1991), Comment and Schwert (1995), Garvey and Hanka (1999), and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003).”
The Incentives for Tax Planning (2012, result): “Finally, similar to Bebchuk et al. (2002), Cheng et al. (2004), and Wahal et al. (1995), we include variables for state antitakeover laws.”
Corporate governance, compensation consultants, and CEO pay levels (2012, background): “Finally, following Bebchuk et al. (2002), Cheng et al. (2005), and Wahal et al. (1995), we include variables for state antitakeover laws.”
The Impact of Stakeholder Orientation on Innovation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2016, unknown): “Along similar lines, Cheng et al. (2004) report that none of the 587 Forbes 500 firms in their panel had changed their state of incorporation during their sample period from 1984 to 1991.”
Corporate governance and the information environment: Evidence from state antitakeover laws ☆ (2012, background): “The evidence in Cheng et al. (2004) is consistent with managers’ tendency to reduce their ownership of stock following the passage of antitakeover laws since they can ensure their prior level of control by holding fewer (risky) shares of their firm. Cheng and Indjejikian (2009) examine how firms cha”
Takeovers and the Cross-Section of Returns (2009, unknown): “We adopt the methodology of Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2005) in focusing on the impact of the first SGAT law passed in each state.”
Board size and firm performance: the moderating effects of the market for corporate control (2008, background): “Previous studies document post-ATL changes in managerial pay, ownership, and firm’s capital structures (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2000; Cheng et al. 2005; Garvey and Hanka 1999).”
Staggered Boards and Earnings Management (2008, background): “4 Other antitakeover devices, such as managerial ownership (Cheng et al. 2005), financial leverage (Garvey and Hanka 1999), state of incorporation (Daines 2001), and poison pills (Berger and Hann 2002), may serve as substitutes for staggered boards.”
Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation (2009, unknown): “Garvey and Hanka (1999) find that leverage decreases upon passage of these antitakeover laws, while Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2005) find decreases in management ownership, supporting the hypothesis that managers try to reduce their exposure to firm risk.”