Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation

By Dilip Mookherjee, Debraj Ray. 2002

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/17ddcb78ad83d516f01fe44ad842cb83971cc04b

Citations in the corpus

• Rural livelihoods and poverty reduction policies. (2005, unknown): “1999); 3 financial market failures combined with either indivisibilities in key investments, such as education or livestock (Loury 1981; Galor and Zeira 1993; Dercon 1998; Mookherjee and Ray 2002); 4 irreversibilities due to subsistence or nutrition thresholds (Dasgupta 1997; Zimmerman and Carter 20”
• Poverty traps and nonlinear income dynamics with measurement error and individual heterogeneity (2005, unknown): “Even with convex technology, Mookherjee and Ray (2002) show that when employers”
• THE TIME STRUCTURE OF SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS (2002, unknown): “Worrall (1994) and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (1997) .”
• Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders (2014, unknown): “…links to research emphasizing market structure as an important cause of contractual frictions in less developed economies (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Mookherjee and Ray, 2002; Kranton and Swamy, 2008).8 The model builds on Burkart and Ellingsen’s (2004) analysis of trade credit in a competitive…”
• Mortality, Human Capital and Persistent Inequality (2003, unknown): “Bolton (1997), Picketty (1997), Maoz and Moav (1999), Ghatak and Jiang (2002), Mookherjee and Ray (2002, 2003) .”