De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence
By Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson. 2006
491 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1181302282c1a6f50143590b72ccada1fe30e430
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- James A. Robinson
- F. Gallego
- Daron Acemoglu
- A. Rodríguez‐Pose
- M. Storper
- Miriam Bruhn
- T. Farole
- William R. Easterly
In Economics and Econometrics
- A. Rodríguez‐Pose
- James A. Robinson
- F. Gallego
- M. Storper
- Daron Acemoglu
- T. Farole
- Miriam Bruhn
- P. Restrepo
In Sociology and Political Science
- James A. Robinson
- M. Storper
- Daron Acemoglu
- F. Gallego
- A. Rodríguez‐Pose
- Miriam Bruhn
- T. Farole
- Elias Papaioannou
Citations in the corpus
- The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development (2010, background): “An external or internal impetus to change de jure institutions may still leave the sources of de facto power intact, and groups that have lost their de jure power may use their de facto power in order to recreate a system similar to the one that has departed (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006c, 2007a).”
- Inequality, Democracy, and Institutions: A Critical Review of Recent Research (2010, unknown): “This idea is formalized in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), arguing that rich agents can offset changes in de jure political power (allocated by political institutions) with changes in de facto power.”
- Cohesion Policy in the European Union: Growth, Geography, Institutions (2011, unknown): “institutional, educational and, above all, the world technological frontier) (Persson et al., 1997; Grossman and Helpman, 2001; Acemoglu, 2006; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2006).”
- Human geography and the institutions that underlie economic growth (2011, background): “…clearly that society-level institutions such as property rights and the rule of law are associated with economic outcomes (cf. Vijayaraghavan and Ward, 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2006b; Rodrik et al., 2004), they have yet to trace the causal mechanisms through processes of micro-economic exchange.”
- Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial Activities: Do They Matter for Economic Development? (2012, background): “71.(6) We exploit this within country variation to study the relationship between di erent colonial activities and economic development in the Americas more explicitly than ES by correlating colonial activities at the region level with current day measures of economic”