Rule of Law and the Resource Curse: Abundance Versus Intensity

By C. Norman. 2009

160 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Building and Construction, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a030421f293f65ea28b8b2092384ff0146866675

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Building and Construction

1. F. van der ploeg
2. E. Papyrakis
3. S. Poelhekke
4. E. Gilberthorpe
5. Andreas Kotsadam
6. Christa N. Brunnschweiler
7. Erwin H. Bulte
8. E. Achuo

In Economics and Econometrics

1. F. van der ploeg
2. E. Papyrakis
3. S. Poelhekke
4. E. Gilberthorpe
5. Andreas Kotsadam
6. Christa N. Brunnschweiler
7. Anja Tolonen
8. Erwin H. Bulte

Citations in the corpus

• The resource curse revisited and revised (2006, unknown): “[37] (lallminpc); and (iii) the (log of) World Bank resource abundance measures for 2000 (lsubsoil00) from Ref.”
• The Pungent Smell of 'Red Herrings': Subsoil Assets, Rents, Volatility and the Resource Curse (2010, unknown): “We also re-examine the evidence for the resource curse using actual subsoil reserves obtained from Norman (2009).”
• Do Natural Resources Attract Nonresource FDI? (2013, background): “For other minerals, we have only reserve data in 1970 from Norman (2009).”
• Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource Abundance, Dependence and the Onset of Civil Wars (2009, methodology): “Estimates of per capita oil production and reserves are taken from Humphreys (2005), while the value of fuel and nonfuel minerals in 1970 (in USD) is taken from Norman (2007) and scaled by population (see below).”
• The extractive industries and development: The resource curse at the micro, meso and macro levels (2015, background): “…several institutional variables (e.g. for corruption, see Arezki and Brückner, 2011; Leite and Weidmann, 2002, for rule of law, see Kolstad, 2009; Norman, 2009; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2012; for quality of bureaucracy, see Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008, Isham et al., 2005; for property…”
• African Mining, Gender, and Local Employment (2014, background): “The efficiency of the economy in general (Norman, 2009) and the protection of property rights can influence the search for and exploitation of resources (Wright and Czelusta, 2003).”
• Finance and Oil. Is there a Resource Curse in Financial Development (2011, unknown): “Cross-country regressions have confirmed this negative relationship between natural resource abundance and the rule of law (Norman, 2009), control of corruption (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004) and overall institutional capacity (Isham et al., 2005).”
• Resource rents and inclusive human development in developing countries (2021, background): “Several studies argue that natural resource wealth negatively impacts on institutional quality as it prevents the development of institutional reforms thereby retarding economic development (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Isham et al., 2005; Norman, 2009).”
• Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse (2008, unknown): “Norman (2005) challenges this finding.”
• The Resource Curse - What Have We Learned from Two Decades of Intensive Research: Introduction to the Special Issue (2017, result): “…Ploeg and Poelhekke claim is likely to depend on resource rents and GDP growth) with the value of ‘not yet extracted reserves per capita’ provided by Norman (2009) – their results are in line with the earlier findings by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) with no evidence of a negative direct link…”