Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading ‐ by Alvin I. Goldman

By D. Weiskopf. 2008

360 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/38b875ccb4407cb301f5797d92ec27c1254d29b5

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In Developmental and Educational Psychology

Citations in the corpus

Inference or interaction: social cognition without precursors (2008, background): “In contrast, on the IT view, the intentionality found in our interactions is not the isolated characteristic of any individual mind; it rather emerges as a product of embodied social interaction (Gallagher 2001; Gibbs 2001; Ratcliffe 2007).”
Navigating Into the Future or Driven by the Past (2013, background): “Consciousness enables better individual prospection and better shared prospection.”
Mirror Neurons, Embodied Simulation, and the Neural Basis of Social Identification (2009, methodology): “In philosophy of mind, the notion of simulation has been used by proponents of the Simulation Theory of mind reading (see Goldman, 2006) to characterize the pretend state adopted by the attributer to understand another person’s behavior.”
Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation (2009, methodology): “Thus, we model the beliefs and intentions of others whom we deal with as if we were in their situation, or as if we were them (Dokic and Proust 2002; Gordon 1996; Goldman 2006).”
Descriptions of Pain, Metaphor, and Embodied Simulation (2010, background): “…phenomena mentioned by Avenanti et al. need to be distinguished, however, from the conscious attribution of mental states (e.g., beliefs) to others (Goldman, 2006), and from the more complex phenomenon known as ‘perspective-taking’—the ability to consider the world from someone else’s viewpoint…”
A Social-Neuroscience Perspective on Empathy (2006, background): “For instance, Hoffman (1981) views empathy as a largely involuntary vicarious response to affective cues from another person, while Batson et al.”
Meta-cognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look (2008, background): “And those who adopt a so-called 'simulationist' account of our mindreading capacity can claim that it is our first-person access to our own mental lives that forms the basis (both developmentally and phylogenetically) for our understanding of the mental lives of others (Goldman, 1993, 2006).”
Mentalizing in the Development and Treatment of Attachment Trauma (2013, background): “As an advanced mentalizer, you know your own mind, and you empathize in part by simulating others’ experience, for example, intuiting what a friend feels by imagining how you would feel in the same circumstances (Goldman, 2006).”
Imitation, empathy, and mirror neurons. (2009, background): “In functional terms, the large-scale network composed of mirror neuron areas, insula , and the limbic system likely provides a simulation-based form of empathy (Goldman 2006, Goldman & Sripada 2005).”
Human Empathy Through the Lens of Social Neuroscience (2006, background): “These data also fit neatly with simulation theory, which states that behavior can be simulated by activating the same neural resources for acting and perceiving[45,46].”
A new theoretical perspective on deception detection: On the psychology of instrumental mind-reading (2008, background): “Obviously, it is beyond the scope of the present paper to enter these debates (but see Goldman, 2006; Malle & Hodges, 2005; and Nichols & Stich, 2003).”
A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science (2012, background): “…approach to mindreading, characteristic attempts to read another person's mind are executed by running a simulation of the target in one's own mind and seeing what mental state emerges (Gordon 1986; Goldman, 1986, 1989, 2006; Gallese and Goldman 1998; Heal 1986; Currie and Ravenscroft 2002).”