:Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange

By Julie Hessler. 2000

217 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/38652abbfc4110a0514beafc6be8755bf78b52e2

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Citations in the corpus

Institutional asymmetry: How formal and informal institutions affect entrepreneurship in Bulgaria (2015, background): “Research on entrepreneurship in transition economies has increasingly taken into account the nature of the institutional framework (Estrin and Prevezer, 2011; Ledeneva, 1998; Mair and Marti, 2009).”
Weak Ties, Information, and Influence: How Workers Find Jobs in a Local Russian Labor Market (2005, background): “As evidence of this, researchers often cite the proverb “It is better to have 100 friends than 100 rubles” (ne imey 100 rubley, a imey 100 druzey) (e.g., Ledeneva 1998:104; Yakubovich 1999:256).”
Why do anti-corruption laws fail in Central Eastern Europe? A target compliance perspective (2012, background): “…– initially formed as a coping strategy in what Kornai coined " the economics of shortage " (1980) – are argued to give rise to cronyism, nepotism, and patronage, and to an unhealthy symbiotic relationship between business and politics (see e.g. Ledeneva 1998; Miller et al. 2001; Karklins 2005).”
Institutional polycentrism, entrepreneurs' social networks, and new venture growth (2013, background): “Political institutional systems that lack democratic checks and balances tend to be weak and unstable, resulting in distrust among social actors, including entrepreneurs in such institutions (Ledeneva, 1998).”
The Impact of Corruption on Firm Tax Compliance in Transition Economies: Whom Do You Trust? (2013, background): “For example, Russia’s blat networks that pre-date Soviet era and relate to the use of extra-market, personal networks and contacts, in circumvention of formal procedures, to obtain goods and services (Ledeneva 1998; Michailova and Worm, 2003).”
Personal Networking in Russia and China:: Blat and Guanxi (2003, background): “During socialism it was an exchange of favors of access in conditions of shortages and a state system of privileges where the favor of access was provided at public expense (Ledeneva, 1998, 1997a, 1997b).”
Corruption and Entrepreneurship: How Formal and Informal Institutions Shape Small Firm Behavior in Transition and Mature Market Economies (2010, background): “The recent analysis of firm behavior in transition economies increasingly takes into account the nature of the institutional framework (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2002, 2006; Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Lui, 2000; Bruton et al., 2005; Ledeneva, 1998; Smallbone & Welter, 2001).”
Do all elements of intellectual capital matter for organizational performance? Evidence from Russian context (2016, background): “The importance of such relationships in the Russian business context has been widely acknowledged in the literature (Ledeneva, 1998; Lonkila, 2011).”
The unrule of law in the making: The politics of informal institution building in Russia (2004, background): “The arbitrary rule and repressive practices of the Russian state ‘from above’ were combated by defensive reactions ‘from below’ in the form of clientelism (Afanas’ev, 2000) and/or blat (Ledeneva, 1998) à la ‘weapons of the weak’ in South-East Asia (Scott, 1985).”