The secret joke of Kant's soul.

By Joshua D. Greene. 2008

848 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/34f76947364dfb36dbd4056e4b5c11ef34c8120f

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In Philosophy

Citations in the corpus

Dual Process Th eories (2013, background): “To study the processes underlying responses to moral dilemmas (see Greene, 2008, 2014), Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, and Hütter (2017) developed a multi-process model that quantifies the contribution of three distinct factors: (1) sensitivity to consequences, (2) sensitivity to moral…”
What is moral reasoning? (2015, background): “There is little doubt, for example, that Hume intends to distinguish moral reasoning from the moral emotions, and Prinz (2006, 2007) and Greene (2008) explicitly draw the same distinction.”
The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Judgment (2010, result): “For my reply, see Greene (2007a).)”
Disgust: evolved function and structure. (2013, background): “Haidt (2001, 2006, 2007, 2012) has persuasively argued that moral judgments are often rooted in intuition rather than logical consideration of the consequences of moral violations (see also Greene, 2007; Nichols, 2002).”
Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie (2009, methodology): “Please cite this article in press as: Greene, J. D. Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, ... Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (2009), doi:10.”
Moral psychology for the twenty-first century (2013, background): “Greene (2008) came to exactly this conclusion in his review of the implications of neuroscience research for moral psychology: We have strong feelings that tell us in clear and certain terms that some things simply cannot be done and that other things simply must be done.”
Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts? (2013, background): “Some ethicists, though, have been critical of the use of intuitions as evidence for moral claims (e.g., Greene, 2007; Rachels, 1979).”
Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. (2008, background): “More specifically, we have argued that utilitarian moral judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes while non-utilitarian (characteristically deontological) judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses (Greene, 2007).”
Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. (2008, background): “Greene (2008) has proposed that affect plays a critical role in generating retributive intuitions.”
Revisiting External Validity: Concerns About Trolley Problems and Other Sacrificial Dilemmas in Moral Psychology (2014, background): “…Greene and colleagues’ dual-process theory andMikhail and colleagues’moral grammar theory, which have spurred evenmore experimentation and methodological and theoretical innovations (see Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 2001; Mikhail, 2007, 2009; and for a broader discussion, Bartels et al., in press).”
The Moral Foreign-Language Effect (2016, background): “We do not claim to have shown that the correlation between thinking in a non-native language and utilitarian judgments shows that utilitarian judgments are superior from the standpoint of normative ethics, as others have suggested (Baron, 1993; Greene, 2008; Singer, 2005), as we make no claim that s”
The moral behavior of ethics professors: Relationships among self-reported behavior, expressed normative attitude, and directly observed behavior (2014, background): “[88] On other possible psychological differences between philosophers with different normative ethical theories, see Bartels and Pizarro (2011) and Greene (2007). [89] Contrast, however, the 2009 Bourget and Chalmers PhilPapers survey: http://philpapers.”
The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values (2014, neutral): “In contrast, Greene and colleagues have proposed an alternative model that affords analytic reasoning processes a larger role in determining moral judgement (Greene, 2007, 2012; Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008; Paxton & Greene, 2010).”