Core in a simple coalition formation game

By Suryapratim Banerjee, Hideo Konishi, Tayfun Sönmez. Social Choice and Welfare, 2001

583 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/34a173cfda5ee0a2d3c0af96b596bebb441f4767

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Citations in the corpus

Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies (2008, unknown): “However, it is not a special case of hedonic games de ned and studied in Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002), Banerjee, Konishi, and Sonmez (2001), and Barbera and Gerber (2007), because of the dynamic interactions introduced by the self-enforcement considerations.”
Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable setsin two-sided matching (2008, unknown): “One popular restriction that guarantees uniqueness of the core is the top-coalition property, introduced by Banerjee et al. (2001). Given a nonempty set of agents T ⊆N , a coalition S ⊆ T is a top coalition of T if, for every i ∈ S, he or she is matched to his or her most preferred partner in T .”
Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation (2004, background): “[4] call top coalition property, since the core is single-valued (following Sönmez’s [14] terminology) there is only one such a mechanism.”
Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation (2010, background): “…build on earlier work by Farrell and Scotchmer (1988), who established the existence of stable coalition structures for equal sharing, and by Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez (2001), who established the existence of stable structures for some other linear sharing rules.6 We go beyond their…”
Ranking Sets of Objects (2001, background): “Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez [9] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [23] have proven that these games can have no stable coalition structures, under different notions of stability, even if the preferences of each player over different coalitions are additively representable.”
The stability and breakup of nations: a quantitative analysis (2011, unknown): “14 However, our game is not “additively separable” which rules out the direct application of the results by Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002).”
Handbook of Computational Social Choice (2016, background): “For hedonic games, more generally, a number of preference restrictions have been identified for which a stable partition is guaranteed to exist for some notion of stability (see, e.g., Alcalde and Revilla, 2004; Aziz and Brandl, 2012; Banerjee et al., 2001; Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002; Dimitrov et”
On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games (2007, background): “As a related study, it was shown in ( Ballester, 2004 ) that, on any preference domain, a contractual individually stable coalition structure always exists, where a coalition structure � is contractual individually stable if and only if nash(�) ∩ cont(�) ∩ weak(�) =∅ . Here, we show that, on any pre”
A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation (2007, background): “ange the existing coalition structure. The problem of existence of (core, Nash, individually and contractually individually) stable coalitions was considered in this and other references, for example [15] and [6]. Recently, [4] compared various notions of stability and equilibria in network formatio”
Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2013, background): “The Coalition Formation Game (cfg) [171, 66, 264] is an extension of sri in which the set of agents A is to be partitioned into coalitions (i.”
The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002, background): “As an easy example of non-existence of a Nash stable coalition partition with such preferences let N = 3 and v1(2) = 2, v2(1) = 1, v1(3) = 1, v3(1) = 2, v2(3) = 2, v3(2) = 1.”