Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable setsin two-sided matching
By Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, W. Vergote. 2008
108 citations recorded by the source corpus.
We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with responsive preferences.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d94ac35aa8770c96017dbd364dcd8bcd8687e627
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Citations in the corpus
- Rational Expectations and Farsighted Stability (2017, background): “…for example, Harsanyi (1974), Aumann and Myerson (1988), Chwe (1994), Bloch (1996), Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999), Xue (1998), Diamantoudi and Xue (2003), Konishi and Ray (2003), Herings et al. (2004, 2009), Ray (2011), Mauleon et al. (2011), Ray and Vohra (2014, 2015), Chander (2015), Kimya (2015).”