A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation
By Krzysztof R. Apt, Andreas Witzel. IGTR, 2007
336 citations recorded by the source corpus.
We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fc7383cc9946f8f41491d578e752b1625dac0fcf
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- Walid Saad
- Zhu Han
- H. Vincent Poor
- Dusist Niyato
- Mingzhe Chen
- Yuanwei Liu
- Medhi Bennis
- Mohammad Mozaffari
Citations in the corpus
- Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks (2008, methodology): “In fact, the complexity of the centralized approach aswell as the need for distributed solutions has sparked a huge growth in the coalition-formation literature that aims to find low complexity and distributed algorithms for forming coalitions [398, 41, 44, 465].”
- Coalitional game theory for communication networks (2009, unknown): “The mo st important type of stability inspected in [27] is Dc-stability.”
- Coalitional Game Theory for Cooperative Micro-Grid Distribution Networks (2011, methodology): “This result is immediate from the fact that, as shown in [10], the Dc-stable partition is a unique outcome of any algorithm based on merge-and-split iterations such as our algorithm in Table I.”