The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures

By Anna Bogomolnaia, Matthew O. Jackson. Games Econ. Behav., 2002

898 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/264cafe57213f12878e91879b14120cc9e399197

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation (2004, methodology): “Therefore, we will follow the formulation provided, independently, by Bogomolnaia and Jackson [5] and by Banerjee et al.”
A Generic Approach to Coalition Formation (2007, background): “The notion of Dp-stability then coincides with the notion of core stability in [5].”
Wireless Information and Power Transfer in Cooperative Networks With Spatially Random Relays (2014, background): “Therefore, the proposed coalitional game can be modeled as a hedonic coalition formation game, in which the coalition formation process is accomplished by applying preference relations [15], [16].”
Handbook of Computational Social Choice (2016, background): “For hedonic games, more generally, a number of preference restrictions have been identified for which a stable partition is guaranteed to exist for some notion of stability (see, e.g., Alcalde and Revilla, 2004; Aziz and Brandl, 2012; Banerjee et al., 2001; Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002; Dimitrov et”
Ranking Sets of Objects (2001, background): “Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez [9] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [23] have proven that these games can have no stable coalition structures, under different notions of stability, even if the preferences of each player over different coalitions are additively representable.”
Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2013, background): “Problems in model (i) in particular have been referred to as Hedonic Games [102, 65].”
Coalitional game theory for communication networks (2009, neutral): “s of the players. In addition, these games admit different stability concepts that are extensions to well known concepts such as the core or the Nash equilibrium used in a coalition formation setting [29]. In this regard, hedonic games constitute a very useful analytical framework which has a very s”
The stability and breakup of nations: a quantitative analysis (2011, neutral): “If the majority requirement were to be replaced by unanimous consent, this stability concept would be reminiscent of contractual individual stability, studied by Greenberg (1977), Drèze and Greenberg (1980), and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002).”
Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks (2008, background): “In addition, these games admit different stability concepts that are extensions to well-known concepts such as the core or the Nash equilibrium used in a coalition-formation setting [77].”
On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games (2007, methodology): “The study of individually stable partitions is the primary focus in ( Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002 ), where the conditions of ordered characteristics and consistency are combined to guarantee the existence of such partitions.”