Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds

By Gerald F. Davis, H. Kim, S. Ross. 2007

461 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d66fcc8cfa9a93df54a12d9295299c60b42d7101

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Citations in the corpus

Exit as Governance: An Empirical Analysis (2010, unknown): “The lack of behavioral variation across these blockholder types is consistent with Davis and Kim (2007), who find that mutual funds’ nexus with management through pension plans only rarely make these funds acquiescent to management decisions.”
Institutional investor cliques and governance (2019, unknown): “in Davis and Kim (2007) as having the most significant positive impact on value.”
The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model (2013, unknown): “3Romano (2001), Kahan and Rock (2007), Davis and Kim (2007), and Cohen and Schmidt (2009) discuss regulatory constraints and incentive biases preventing mutual funds and pension funds from active monitoring.”
Hidden power of the Big Three? Passive index funds, re-concentration of corporate ownership, and new financial risk† (2017, background): “2 See Deeg and Hardie (2016) for an insightful overview of different types of investors on a patient–non patient scale and a discussion on the differences between active and passive asset managers.”
The Effect of Liquidity on Governance (2011, background): “3 Davis and Kim (2007) show that mutual funds with more business ties in aggregate are more likely to vote with management in general, although at the individual firm level they are no more likely to vote with management of client firms than of non-clients.”
Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners (2016, background): “some large passive investors do vary their voting strategies across firms in ways that are not consistent with such a one-size-fits-all approach to governance (Davis and Kim, 2007), additional analysis regarding”
The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world (2008, unknown): “For example, Fidelity is reported to be more aggressive on governance issues in Europe, but it is relatively acquiescent in the U.S. where it manages several corporate pension accounts (Business Week, 2006; Davis and Kim, 2006).”
The Network of Global Corporate Control (2011, methodology): “On the contrary, [18] and [19] find that mutual funds, which typically hold large blocks of shares, vote against the management (i.”
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors (2009, unknown): “The industryadjusted return is the difference between the target’s buy-and-hold return and the return for all firms (target excluded) in the target’s Fama-French (1997) 48-industry code.”