Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models

By Bruno Jullien. Journal of Economics Theory, 2000

490 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/31a6f5c5c8c373b5015d5c9221339a8ea71116a8

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Citations in the corpus

Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case (2006, background): “(3)Jullien-Salanié-Salanié (1999) shows that for a given incentive contract (W, ∆) and a given technology c, the optimal probability of failure (locally) decreases in risk aversion if and only if this probability is small enough.”
Optimal Income Tax under the Threat of Migration by Top-Income Earners (2010, methodology): “Sappington (1989), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), and Jullien (2000)) and introduce them in Mirrlees problem. We model an asymmetric situation in which the tax policy of a highly redistributive country is challenged by the low-tax or no-tax policy of one of its neighbours. There is no competition”
Nonlinear Pricing of Information Goods (2003, unknown): “…which may yield more general results involve modeling horizontally differentiated information goods (as in the monopoly model of Weber, 2001), using a model of monopolistic competition (as in Banker, Khosla, and Sinha 1998), or modeling the presence of an outside good (as in Jullien, 2000).”
Contracting and Coordination under Asymmetric Production Cost Information (2012, background): “The adverse selection models with type-dependent reservation proﬁts have been studied in the economics literature; see, for example, Maggi and Rodr í guez-Clare (1995), Jullien (2000), and Laffont and Martimort (2002).”
Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information (2003, background): “The moral hazard literature2 tells us that providing incen- 1See Jullien (2000) among others.”
Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly (2009, unknown): “The analysis of outsourcing is somewhat more interesting as it involves the design of incentive contracts under typevarying participation constraint (Jullien 2000).”
The Organization of Supplier Networks: Effects of Delegation and Intermediation (2004, background): “The converse of course may not be true: any revelation side contract satisfying the truth-telling constraints and the nonnegative interim utility property (15) may”
Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry (2004, background): “Jullien (2000) deals with the regulator’s shutdown option by transforming the case where some firm types are excluded into a more tractable fullparticipation model.”
The Economics of Multidimensional Screening (2003, background): “23 See, for example, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), Lewis and Sappington (1989a, 1989b), and Jullien (2000).”
Price Discrimination and Competition (2007, methodology): “…the methodology of typedependent participation constraints; see, for example, Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi and RodriguezClare (1995) and Jullien (2000). the nature of the participation constraint and the form of preference heterogeneity – horizontal or vertical.59 • Horizontal…”
Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation (2002, methodology): “See, for example, Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) and Jullien (2000).”
Preventing Zombie Lending (2014, background): “In our case, though, the type-dependent outside option is not concave but convex in types, due to the convexity introduced by limited liability, which has been shown to imply that rents can be eliminated for a range of types (Maggi and Rodŕıguez-Clare, 1995; Jullien, 2000).”