Earnings Management and Executive Compensation: A Case of Overdose of Option and Underdose of Salary?

By R. Shrieves, Pengjie Gao. 2002

146 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/31042c2fb06e6c956134fb20724bb417a4c00ca3

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Citations in the corpus

Trading incentives to meet the analyst forecast (2006, background): “…higher proportions of stock-based compensation and greater pay-for-performance sensitivity are more likely to commit earnings fraud, and Gao and Shrieves (2002) and Cheng and Warfield (2005) show that firms that offer high levels of stock compensation are more likely to have high discretionary…”
The Impact of Performance-based Compensation on Misreporting (2006, background): “Although Gao and Shrieves (2002) attribute this relation to the manager’s attempt to exploit the nonlinearity in the option compensation payoff, they do not test for this empirically.”
Performance, Growth and Earnings Management (2006, background): “Gao and Shrieves (2002) find that earnings management is negatively related to salary and positively related to option and restricted stocks in the compensation plan.”
Corporate Governance and Pay-for-Performance: The Impact of Earnings Management (2008, background): “Gao and Shrieves (2002), Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2005), and Cheng and Warfield (2005) all find that the magnitude of discretionary accruals is greater and earnings management is more prevalent at firms in which managers' wealth is more closely tied to the value of…”
The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Compensation (2006, unknown): “Gao and Shrieves (2002) find that earnings management intensity, as measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals, is increasing in the amount of options and bonuses and decreasing in salaries.”