Trading incentives to meet the analyst forecast

By Sarah E. McVay, Venky Nagar, Vicki Wei Tang. 2006

150 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2d810ffcbddc2a128130dee88ea5b3ff2ffcd252

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In Accounting

1. G. He
2. Weili Ge
3. Catherine Schrand
4. Patricia M. Dechow
5. Brossa Wong
6. C. Man
7. Daniel Wangerin
8. Richard G. Sloan

In Finance

1. Patricia M. Dechow
2. Catherine Schrand
3. G. He
4. David Veenman
5. H. A. Skaife
6. Brossa Wong
7. Chan Lyu
8. Kemin Wang

Citations in the corpus

• The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality (2015, methodology): “A stream of prior research (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Moehrle 2002; McVay et al. 2006; Ayers et al. 2006) provides evidence that earnings are likely managed when firms just meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts.”
• GDP management to meet or beat growth targets (2018, background): “Prior studies find that managers’ compensation and promotion opportunities are positively linked to beating targets such as analyst forecasts (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; McVay et al., 2006).”
• Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Survey of Literature (2013, background): “They find that like other measures of earnings management, one of the motivations to shift core expenses to special items is to meet analyst earnings forecasts (McVay et al., 2006).”
• Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from the Profitability of Insider Trading (2013, background): “Prior literature documents insider sales transactions are associated with abnormal accruals (Bartov and Mohanram 2004; Cheng and Warfield 2005; McVay et al. 2006).”
• Has goodwill accounting gone bad? (2017, background): “(2006) and McVay et al. (2006) find that managers have strong incentives to manage earnings”
• Earnings Management Using Classification Shifting: an Examination of Core Earnings and Special Items (2006, unknown): “…might wish to meet the analyst forecast in order to maximize their cash bonus (Matsunaga and Park 2001), sell their shares (Richardson et al. 2004; McVay et al. 2006), or maximize their compensation in general, as compensation committees tend to shield managers from income-decreasing transitory…”
• Non-GAAP earnings and board independence (2011, unknown): “12 Yi (2007) and Kolev et al.”
• Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences (2010, background): “, 2002) or managers’ compensation/stock ownership (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; McVay et al., 2006).”
• Why do CFOs Become Involved in Material Accounting Manipulations (2011, unknown): “On one hand, a few papers document that CEO equity incentives appear to be associated with various earnings management measures, such as discretionary accruals, the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst forecasts, and the likelihood of restatements (e.g., Bartov and Mohanram, 2004; Cheng and Warf”