Optimal Executive Compensation when Firm Size Follows Geometric Brownian Motion

By Zhiguo He. 2009

153 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2fb6f25eba96882831c733e8f7636c7c246ee6dd

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Zhiguo He
2. Neng Wang
3. Peter M. DeMarzo
4. Michael J. Fishman
5. Arvind Krishnamurthy
6. Tomasz Piskorski
7. Alexei Tchistyi
8. Alex Edmans

In Finance

1. Zhiguo He
2. Neng Wang
3. Peter M. DeMarzo
4. Michael J. Fishman
5. Tomasz Piskorski
6. Alexei Tchistyi
7. S. D. Tella
8. Yuliy Sannikov

In Strategy and Management

1. Neng Wang
2. Zhiguo He
3. Peter M. DeMarzo

Citations in the corpus

• Managerial Turnover in a Changing World (2012, unknown): “(2006), Biais et al. ð2007Þ, DeMarzo and Fishman ð2007Þ, and He ð2009Þ.”
• Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment (2012, background): “Similar to DeMarzo and Sannikov (2007) and He (2007), there is a sufficient condition for the optimality of a = {μ} against at = 0 for some t (shirking sometimes).”
• A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure (2011, unknown): “The reason is debt-overhang, where I interpret the agent’s effort as a form of investment; see Hennessy (2004) for a similar mechanism.”
• Calibrated Incentive Contracts (2013, unknown): “This includes non-stationary environments (as in Battaglini (2005), Tchistyi (2006), He (2009), Pavan et al. (2010) or Garrett and Pavan (2010)), and settings with both moral hazard and adverse selection (such as Sannikov (2007) or Fong (2008)).”