Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds

By Edwin J. Elton, Martin Gruber, Christopher R. Blake. 2003

465 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2f6060283eddab818761721279df87d674757687

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In Finance

1. Melvyn Teo
2. Vikas Agarwal
3. Narayan Naik
4. Henri Servaes
5. Ajay Khorana
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Citations in the corpus

• Investor monitoring and differences in mutual fund performance (2006, methodology): “For example, Elton et al. (2003) utilize expense-adjusted alphas to determine that funds with performance-based incentive fees employ more skillful managers than funds without an incentive fee structure.”
• On the Industry Concentration of Actively Managed Equity Mutual Funds (2005, unknown): “2 For evidence on fund performance, see, for example, Jensen (1968), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Elton et al. (1993), Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Malkiel (1995), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Ferson and Schadt (1996), Ferson and Warther (1996), Baks, Metrick, and Wachter (2001), Elton, G”
• Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry (2019, background): “It is well documented that explicit performance-based incentives rarely exist in advisory contracts (e.g., Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003) and Golec and Starks (2004)), likely due to the fact that advisory contracts are prohibited from having asymmetric incentive fees.”
• Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future (2007, unknown): “©2007, CFA Institute”
• Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry (2009, unknown): “Explicit incentive contracts are not very common in the mutual fund industry ( Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2003 ).”
• Institutional Investors, Past Performance, and Dynamic Loss Aversion (2009, background): “…is often viewed as a convex function of performance (Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Del Guercio and Tkac (2008)), funds tend to cut risk following bouts of good performance and increase risk following bouts of poor performance (Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003)).”
• Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance (2009, background): “Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003) find that funds that charge such symmetric incentive fees earn positive alphas.”
• Tournaments in Mutual Fund Families (2008, unknown): “This contradicts empirical evidence presented by Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Koski and Pontiff (1999), and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003).”