Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

285 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Managerial Risk Taking (2016, unknown): “In the case of mutual funds, for example, Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) find that in bad years (bear markets), mutual fund managers may take fewer risks if they are in the looser category but take more risk if they are in the better performing category.”
Disentangling Risk and Change (2015, methodology): “Similarly, small-cap stocks have been associated with higher risk than large-cap stocks (Banz, 1981; Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele, 2009).”
Playing It Safe? Managerial Preferences, Risk, and Agency Conflicts (2016, background): “For example, see Smith and Stulz (1985), Lambert (1986), Hirshleifer and Suh (1992), Hugonnier and Morellec (2007), and Acharya and Bisin (2009).”
Corporate Governance and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Director Limited Liability and Indemnification Provisions (2011, background): “…strategies that are suboptimal from shareholders’ perspective, due to their concerns for the private benefits from control and their non-diversified firm-specific human capital (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; John et al., 2008; Kempf et al., 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009).”