Tournaments in Mutual Fund Families

By Alexander Kempf, Stefan Ruenzi. 2008

312 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9e157567d7b6174163e60948f827a0b100fae1b6

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Citations in the corpus

Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, background): “Testing this prediction, Kini and Williams (2012) document a significantly positive relationship between firm risk and tournament incentives.”
Conflicting Family Values in Mutual Fund Families (2013, background): “7 Massa (2003) finds that non-performance-related fund characteristics, such as product differentiation, are also used to establish family reputation.”
Risk Shifting and Mutual Fund Performance (2010, unknown): “(4)See for example, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Koski and Pontiff (1999), Busse (2001), and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003).”
Mean field and n‐agent games for optimal investment under relative performance criteria (2017, background): “Competition among fund managers is well documented in investment practice for both mutual and hedge funds; see, for example, Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2003); Basak and Makarov (2015); Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001); Chevalier and Ellison (1997); Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers (2008); Gallah”
Private equity investment criteria: An experimental conjoint analysis of venture capital, business angels, and family offices (2019, background): “Similar to mutual fund managers, their professional identity stems from their reputation in the market, which is to a large degree gained and sustained through their investment track record (Chevalier and Ellison 1999; Kempf and Ruenzi, 2007).”
Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry (2009, unknown): “This finding is confirmed in several follow-up studies like Koski and Pontiff (1999), Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003), Qiu (2003), Hu, Kale and Subramaniam (2005), and Pagani (2006). However, Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996), and Kempf and Ruenzi (2002) report that the risk taking behavior of fund man”