Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development
By Torsten Persson. 2005
210 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2eef7348bb3f27ecf7d67795a19cfc958277f84f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Jørgen Juel Andersen
- S. Aslaksen
- Antonio Fatás
- I. Mihov
- Yongfu Huang
- Scott Stern
- A. Boschini
- J. Pettersson
In Sociology and Political Science
- Jørgen Juel Andersen
- Elias Papaioannou
- Gregorios Siourounis
- C. Ketels
- J. Pettersson
- Yongfu Huang
- Jesper Roine
- A. Boschini
Citations in the corpus
- Constitutions and the resource curse (2008, background): “Persson (2005) lists reform episodes that is, exits from and entries into di¤erent forms of democracy for the period 1962-1998.”
- Political Institutions and Financial Development: An Empirical Study (2010, background): “…that the democratic process enhances fundamental civil liberties, stable politics, and an open society; promotes property rights protection and contract enforcement; discourages corruption and lawlessness, and fosters economic growth (Clague et al., 1996; Minier, 1998; Olson, 1993; Persson, 2005).”
- Democracy and Reforms: Evidence from a New Dataset (2010, unknown): “In comparison, we find little evidence of feedback effects from reforms to democracy.5 Similarly, Persson (2005) shows that the forms of democracy (parliamentary, proportional and permanent ones) are important in explaining variation in trade reforms (measured by the Wacziarg and Welch index) and…”
- Moving to a New Global Competitiveness Index (2008, background): “29 Persson and Tabellini 2007; Persson 2005; Brunetti 2002; Tavares and Wacziarg 2001; Barro 1996.”
- Policy Volatility, Institutions, and Economic Growth (2013, background): “This group includes Ramey and Ramey (1995), Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Imbs (2007), Martin and Rogers (2000), Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005), and Aghion et al.”
- The Resource Curse and its Potential Reversal (2013, methodology): “This underlines the results in Persson (2005) which suggest precisely that the form of democracy (rather than democracy vs. nondemocracy) is important for the adoption of the structural policies that promote long-run economic performance.”
- Inequality, Democracy, and Institutions: A Critical Review of Recent Research (2010, unknown): “Persson (2005) develops the democracy argument further by presenting empirical evidence that proportional and parliamentary democracies are more conducive to property rights protection and growth-enhancing policies than presidential and majoritarian systems.”
- Democracy and Globalization (2008, unknown): “Persson (2005) argues that countries that have a longer history of autonomous rule are more likely to adopt democratic institutions.”
- Historical Origins of Schooling: The Role of Democracy and Political Decentralization (2010, unknown): “Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Easterly and Levine (2003), and Persson (2005), among others, also use an overidentification test to study the validity of using historical variables to explain current institutions.”
- Institutions and Economic Performance: Endogeneity and Parameter Heterogeneity (2009, unknown): “The Over-ID Test is accepted and the political instruments perform strongly as previously shown in different contexts by Persson (2004, 2005) and Eicher Schreiber (2005).”
- The curse of aid (2008, unknown): “This corroborates previous studies, among them Sachs and Warner (1999) and Auty (1990).”