Non-GAAP earnings and board independence

By Richard M. Frankel, Sarah E. McVay, Mark T. Soliman. 2011

214 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fb2aedf7018e10abb6fdaece3244042264df0984

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Benjamin C. Whipple
2. Theodore E. Christensen
3. Kurt H. Gee
4. Mark Bradshaw
5. Sarah E. McVay
6. Eric C. So
7. Martin Walker
8. Reuven Lehavy

In Strategy and Management

1. Theodore E. Christensen
2. Kurt H. Gee
3. Benjamin C. Whipple
4. Mark Bradshaw
5. Sarah E. McVay
6. Eric C. So
7. Reuven Lehavy
8. Jeffery Abarbanell

Citations in the corpus

• Information Asymmetry and Corporate Governance (2015, unknown): “Gillan et al. (2011) report that the board independence and takeover market can work as substitutes.”
• Analysts’ GAAP earnings forecasts and their implications for accounting research (2018, background): “, 2014), most conclude that nonGAAP reporting is at least partially motivated by opportunism, such as benchmark beating (e.g., Doyle et al., 2003; Baik et al., 2009; Black and Christensen, 2009; Frankel et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2012a; Barth et al., 2012; Doyle et al., 2013; Christensen et al., 20”
• The Disclosure of Non-GAAP Earnings Information in the Presence of Transitory Gains (2014, unknown): “2 See for example, Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Doyle et al. 2003; Lougee and Marqu dt 2004; Johnson and Schwartz 2005; Black and Christensen 2009; Frankel et al. 2011; Doyle et al. 2013.”