Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting

By Carl Shapiro. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 2000

1,509 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2d02264c51fea578e11a37156bd09a03211a8ab2

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Citations in the corpus

Ten Facts on Declining Business Dynamism and Lessons from Endogenous Growth Theory (2019, positive): “…the extent that these thickets are exclusively used for defensive purposes, they may undermine the activity of followers, as they form, in words of Shapiro (2001), “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize…”
R&D and the Patent Premium (2008, neutral): “Similarly, Shapiro (2000) suggests that for complex products (cf. Cohen et al., 2000), firms often possess numerous and overlapping patent rights, giving rise to " thickets " where transactions costs can impede innovation .”
The Product Market and the Market for 'Ideas': Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs (2003, positive): “For example, even when patent or copyright protection is modest, the 10 ability to use litigation to temporarily halt the activities of an expropriator provides incentives for potential users to reach an agreement with the entrepreneur (Shapiro, 2001).”
The Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing Rules (2008, background): “In the theoretical discussion above, we distinguish between pools consisting of patents which are substitutes or complements: that is, between pools where the motivation is to avoid Bertrand competition between licensees and those where the goal is to avoid the familiar problem of each party demandi”
Is There a Market for Ideas (2010, neutral): “While the challenges of hold-up over intellectual property and the potential for patent thickets has been extensively discussed (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Shapiro, 2001; Heller, 2008), we are making the more nuanced claim that the potential for hold-up undermines the incentives for both buyers and s”
The Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence from Patent Grant Delays (2008, background): “Conversely, studies of the “patent thicket” in the semiconductor industry (Shapiro 2001) suggest significant barriers to efficient technological trade (and the ability of enforceable IP rights in reducing those barriers) in those sectors.”
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment (2008, background): “Finally, as they have done in the study of natural resource management, systematic analyses of cultural commons across a wide range of collected case studies should lead us to doubt panacea prescriptions drawn from overly simplistic models.”
The Innovation-Economic Growth Nexus: Global Evidence (2010, background): “If the market is competitive, some firms may want to create entry barriers by erecting patent “thickets” around certain technologies (Shapiro, 2001).”
Knowledge-Based Capital, Innovation and Resource Allocation (2013, background): “webs of overlapping IPRs (Shapiro, 2001)(27) – can result in firms paying licensing fees to multiple parties or having production held-up as they try to commercialise new technology (UK IPO, 2011).”
An Empirical Study on the Determinants of Essential Patent Claims in Compatibility Standards (2011, background): “The effects of ‘royalty stacking’ are discussed by Shapiro (2001) and Lemley and Shapiro (2007), and are critically commented on by Geradin et al. (2008).”