The Salience of Market, Bureaucratic, and Clan Controls in the Management of Family Firm Transitions: Some Tentative Australian Evidence

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Accounting Research in Family Firms: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges (2014, background): “…the board/top management Family firms have lower likelihood of auditor resignation, and abnormal returns following auditor resignations are higher Moores and Mula (2000) FBR MA Management control Life cycle, Org. control Family Externally defined Family firms use different control mechanisms at…”
Family Firm Types Based on the Professionalization Construct (2013, methodology): “For further theoretical underpinnings for the family business professionalization process, we refer to the work of Moores and Mula (2000), Songini (2006), and YildirimÖktem and Üsdiken (2010).”
Paradigms and Theory Building in the Domain of Business Families (2009, background): “…governance structures such as oversight boards, monitoring mechanisms, incentives, and strategic planning systems of family firms may need to differ from those of nonfamily firms (Craig & Moores, 2005; Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005; Mishra, Randoy, & Jensen, 2001; Moores & Mula, 2000).”
Family Involvement and Agency Cost Control Mechanisms in Family Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprises (2015, background): “On the other hand, according to stewardship theory (Moores and Mula 2000) FIM improves family members’ understanding of the competitive challenges and opportunities facing the firm, favor the sharing of common vision and objectives, and thus reduces the need for agency cost control mechanisms.”