Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional Investor Activists 'Just Vote No'?

By Diane Del Guercio, Laura Seery, Tracie Woidtke. 2008

367 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2c90023c5c5a11b5949f44e6e9ba5198603e5ce4

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Citations in the corpus

The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance (2011, result): “(2010) add that their directors also become less likely to be reelected and more likely to lose other directorships, in many cases due to dissatisfied activists targeting director elections with “just vote no” campaigns (Del Guercio et al., 2008). Despite these key results, the literature is inconcl”
Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests (2014, background): “The pattern is consistent with recent evidence, which shows that other incidences of shareholder activism have become more frequent over time (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2000; Del Guercio et al., 2008).”
Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research (2017, neutral): “For example, Del Guercio, and Hawkins (1999) examine changes in operating return on assets and operating return on sales from one year before through one year after a firm first receives a shareholder proposal.”
Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections (2009, methodology): “…previous studies of contested election tallies, which find similar relations using votes cast for various shareholder proposals (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Ferri, Markarian, and Sandino, 2004; and Ferri, Ertimur, and Stubben, 2008) and votes cast during vote-no campaigns (Del Guercio et al., 2008).”
Independent Director Incentives: Where Do Talented Directors Spend Their Limited Time and Energy? (2014, background): “1 See Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999), Farrell and Whidbee (2000), Yermack (2004), Kaplan and Reishus (1990), Gilson (1990), Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008), Fich and Shivdasani (2007), Srinivasan (2005), and others.”
Do Index Funds Monitor? (2021, result): “This observation is consistent with the argument of Del Guercio et al. (2008) and Bebchuk et al. (2017) that it is costly for shareholders to openly oppose firm management.”
Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance (2010, background): “DelGuercio et al. (2008) study a sample of 112 publicly announced just-vote-no campaigns, which are typically targeted at directors of large capitalization, under-performing firms.”
Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance (2010, neutral): “Del Guercio et al. (2008) suggest that, despite their low cost, shareholder proposals have not been very effective in changing firm behaviour and performance.”